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U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY: Beyond the Cold War

David Jablonsky
Ronald Steel
Lawrence Korb
Morton H. Halperin
Robert Ellsworth

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
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**U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY:
BEYOND THE COLD WAR**

**David Jablonsky
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July 26, 1997



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Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Ave, Carlisle, PA 17013-5244. Dr. Jablonsky can be reached by calling (717) 245-3341, FAX (717) 245-3530, or by e-mail at jablonsd@carlisle-emh2.army.mil. Copies of this report may be obtained from the Publications and Production Office by calling commercial (717) 245-4133, DSN 242-4133, FAX (717) 245-3820, or via the Internet at rummelr@carlisle-emh2.army.mil

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FOREWORD

U.S. national security is a subject that has been under intense scrutiny since the end of the Cold War. What constitutes such security for the United States as this country approaches the new century? Are the ends, ways, and means of our national security and national military strategies sufficient to provide for the nation's future? And above all, as this country celebrates the 50th anniversary of the National Security Act of 1947, are the institutions that resulted from that act still sufficient for the post-Cold War era?

With these questions in mind, the Strategic Studies Institute and Dickinson College's Clarke Center co-sponsored the series of lectures on American national security after the Cold War which are contained in this volume. The lectures take four different, yet complementary, perspectives. *Professor Ronald Steel* reminds us of the intellectual revolution embodied in the act that moved America from the concept of "defense" to one of "national security" and relates this concept to our attempts to define post-Cold War national security interests. *Dr. Lawrence Korb* reviews the evolution in our national security establishment since the 1947 act. *Dr. Morton Halperin's* focus is the continuing tension between secrecy in the name of national security and the openness required in a democratic society, with a commentary on continuing threats to civil liberties. In the concluding essay, *Ambassador Robert Ellsworth* surveys the key strategic challenges facing the United States as we enter the 21st century.

To set the context, *Dr. David Jablonsky* outlines the transformations in national security paradigms that the United States undertook a half-century ago, and that we wrestle with today. The contributions of these expert scholars and practitioners in the field of national security bear directly on the issues which will shape the nation's 21st century destiny.


RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

David Jablonsky

THE STATE OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY STATE

The summer of 1997 marks the 50th anniversary of the National Security Act, the legislation that established the primary institutional basis for the American national security state in the Cold War. The fundamental framework of that state still exists almost a decade after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Should it continue as the United States approaches the millennium? If not, why not, and how should it be altered? In order to begin to respond to these questions, the U.S. Army War College and Dickinson College sponsored a series of lectures focused on the concept of U.S. national security beyond the Cold War. Four eminent scholars and practitioners concerned with U.S. national security issues participated: Dr. Morton Halperin, Professor Ronald Steel, Ambassador Robert Ellsworth, and Dr. Lawrence Korb. Their lectures are contained in this volume.

The purpose of this introductory essay is to set the stage for these presentations. Two themes dominate. The first involves the proper mix of change and continuity, always a key concern in a transitional era. This theme is examined against the backdrop of three interconnected currents in American history: U.S. core national interests, the concept of U.S. national security envisioned as serving those interests, and the U.S. grand strategy designed to support the concept of national security. The second theme is concerned with the form and function of government—or more specifically, how well throughout American history the form of U.S. government has functioned in order to meet the requirements of the U.S. grand strategy designed to further U.S. national security interests. Together, these themes comprise a major part of the broad strategic

landscape used by the four lecturers in this volume to examine national security strategy beyond the Cold War.

PRE-COLD WAR

Change and Continuity.

National Interests and the Concept of National Security. Lord Palmerston described core national interests in 1848 as the “eternal” and ultimate justification for national policy.¹ For the United States, these interests can be divided into three categories: physical security, economic prosperity, and promotion of values.² Physical security is defined as the protection against attack on the territory and people of a nation-state in order to ensure survival with fundamental values and institutions intact. It is the core interest most often associated with the concept of national security. James Madison, for instance, referred in *The Federalist* to “security against foreign danger” as the primary reason for shifting power to the central government from the member states.³ It was not until the 1940s that the term “national security” came into full usage in U.S. political discourse.⁴ But long before that, the concept of U.S. national security had come to address not just the fulfillment of physical security, but the other two core interests concerning economic prosperity and promotion of values as well.

In the course of that development throughout American history, there was a concomitant evolution in the concept of national security that embodied both change and continuity. From the very beginning of the Republic, the national security of the United States was perceived as having both a foreign and domestic component. Until the 1870s, both U.S. components tended to merge, with national security primarily tied to both the safety of national borders and the preservation of the federal union. The 1823 Monroe Doctrine appeared to stretch the American concept of national security to the Western Hemisphere, but there was no real substance to this doctrine. Beginning in the 1880s, however, and lasting to the end of the 1930s, U.S. presidents

returned to the Monroe Doctrine and, by identifying U.S. security with that of other hemispheric nations, caused the concept to enlarge. That this identification could have an even broader context when coupled with values going back as far as Jefferson's concept of an "empire for liberty," was demonstrated in World War I by Woodrow Wilson, who, like Monroe, perceived linkage between U.S. security interests and those of other states attempting to be free and independent. This tendency was solidified at the beginning of World War II when Franklin Roosevelt identified Great Britain in 1941 as the front line of U.S. security.⁵ While fighting that war and making preparations for the peace, U.S. leaders continued to expand the concept of national security and used its terminology for the first time to explain America's relationship to the world.

Throughout this same period, the perception by U.S. leaders of the domestic component of national security continued to evolve and bring a renewed focus on economic prosperity. By the end of the 19th century, the full impact of the industrial revolution combined with cheap migrant labor from Europe and a series of depressions led to increased worker unrest. As a consequence, presidential focus on national security in the new century began to identify the possibility of domestic class conflict as the major source of insecurity. One result was reform by Theodore Roosevelt who, like Washington, believed "the general welfare" was an active component of "the common defense."⁶

This domestic preoccupation emerged again after World War I and directly affected the foreign component of U.S. national security. A major cause involved post-war social problems concerning relationships between city and town and foreign- and native-born. These problems increased national longings for a homogenous America, reflected at home in a xenophobia marked by the growth of the Ku Klux Klan and the passage of the National Origins Act of 1924, and abroad by economic nationalism and political isolation. The result in the return to "normalcy" of the Harding and Coolidge administrations was the primacy of domestic

politics in national security: the idea that external security was a by-product of American domestic economic prosperity, not something that required domestic reinforcement. All these tendencies converged in the Great Depression, perceived as the ultimate threat to U.S. national security interests, whether in the linkage of the economic downturn to domestic unrest or to the potential destruction of the primary institutions and values of a democratic, capitalistic America. Ultimately, it would take an expanded foreign component of the U.S. national security concept in reaction to World War II to meet this threat.⁷

Grand Strategy. Prior to the Cold War, the strategies that served the three core U.S. interests ranged from the global to the insular, depending on the relationship between the foreign and domestic components of U.S. national security. The drive for physical security in a global sense was directly tied to the expanding identification of U.S. interests with those of other states, which in turn led to the concepts of both balance of power and, to a lesser extent, collective security. Balance of power was considered at times in U.S. history to be immoral and unstable. And yet both Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt considered the concept a vital enough matter to lead America into two World Wars, primarily oriented on a view of national security that entailed preventing the emergence of a single Eurasian hegemon with a capability to wage war on the continental United States. In a similar manner, Wilson's concept of collective security in one sense was nothing more than an attempt to meet the expanded notion of U.S. national security by regulating the global balance with a community of power.⁸

The other extreme concerning national physical security was isolationism, which simply meant a refusal to make commitments in advance that might detract from American freedom of action. This strategic approach was popular throughout much of U.S. history because it worked. It was a realistic strategy when there were few foreign threats and the nation was focused on economic growth and continental

expansion. The problem was that in the modern age the preoccupation with the domestic component of national security sustained the dangerous illusion that isolationism was still viable. "What gave isolationism a bad name was not that it failed to provide security to the country for over a century," Terry Deibel has pointed out, "but that Americans failed to abandon it when the conditions required for its success disappeared at the beginning of the twentieth century."⁹

The dichotomy between the global and inward strategies was also evident in the search for American economic prosperity. The global focus was inherent in the underlying philosophical belief in free trade and economic opportunities throughout most of American history. In the 19th century, for example, the U.S. Open Door Policy in the Far East reflected such a belief. This concern with equality of economic opportunity also spilled over into the expanding concept of U.S. national security. Thus, while balance of power remained an underlying cause of American involvement in conflicts with European powers, the wars of 1812 and 1917 also involved maintaining the U.S. right as a neutral to trade with any and all belligerents in the conflicts. On the other hand, high tariffs and protectionism represented the historical inward-looking strategies focused on a constricted domestic-oriented concept of national security. These strategies generally provided continuity from the Civil War until discredited by the Great Depression, when free trade once again became orthodox American policy.¹⁰

In a similar manner, for much of its history the United States promoted its national values by example, the oldest form of the "city upon a hill" projection. The change from this inward-oriented "great exemplar" strategy began with the expansion of the U.S. concept of national security. This was particularly evident when that expansion involved the United States in foreign wars, and it became apparent that idealism was a necessary ingredient if a broader concept of national security were to sustain public support. Whether it was Wilson in 1917 citing the need to make the world safe

for democracy or FDR in 1941 adding reformist contributions to the Atlantic Charter, the ideological promotion of national values provided a needed counterbalance to the geopolitical focus on balance of power in terms of rationale for the use of force to support U.S. national security.¹¹

Form and Function.

For most of U.S. history, the form of the American government has been in keeping with the functions required by the changing concepts of national security and the strategies designed to meet those concepts. The result was normally a weak central government, Cincinnati in form, expanding in wartime and contracting after every conflict. This government was served by a small volunteer military dependent on the draft only as an outgrowth of war—and even then not a welcome one as the New York City riots demonstrated when conscription was introduced halfway through the Civil War. It was also a government that normally used private industry only in emergencies, depending instead on its own arsenals and shipyards to meet the peacetime requirements of the military. But as World War I approached, the demands of a growing military exceeded the capacity of federal facilities to meet them. The outcome was more continuous peacetime cooperation between the military and private industry, which continued to increase in the war. After that conflict, however, there were allegations that the cooperation had resulted in widespread profiteering for the “merchants of death” who had even instigated the war to gain those profits. As a consequence, the interwar years were marked by public hostility toward private arms makers which, combined with low military budgets and congressional willingness to follow the public will, limited government connections with private industry and caused most research and procurement to be reconcentrated in federal facilities.¹²

This limited centralization of executive function was the exception in the decade after World War I in which the national government was primarily concerned with

handling mail, regulating immigration, collecting tariffs, and enforcing Prohibition. "If the Federal Government should go out of existence," Calvin Coolidge commented, "the common run of people would not detect the difference in the affairs of their daily life for a considerable length of time."¹³ Only after the onset of the Great Depression, did the U.S. Government begin to systematically affect the daily lives of its citizens in the form of support to farmers, regulation of markets, mediation of labor disputes, and aid to the aged and infirm.

Despite this relative expansion, the focus of the government remained traditionally inward throughout the decade in response to the overwhelming domestic economic threat to national security. Thus, while maintaining a respectable navy, there was no attempt by the United States to arm itself in order to deal with other states in this period. And, in fact, the U.S. Army in 1938 was smaller than that of Rumania. In addition, the American diplomatic corps was relatively new and only professional in part, with the posting of most ambassadors determined by the size of their campaign contributions. At the same time, there were no secret intelligence services to speak of except for a few cryptanalysts. As a result, the principal agencies for the foreign component of national security—the Departments of State, War and Navy—were housed in what today is the Old Executive Office Building and in the World War I "tempo," the "temporary" buildings constructed in 1917 on Constitution Avenue that were still being used in the Eisenhower administration. On the other side of the White House, the Department of the Treasury alone was situated in an edifice of almost equivalent space to the Old Executive Office Building, while the other agencies concerned with the domestic component of national security—Commerce, Labor, Agriculture and Justice—occupied the grand neoclassical structures along 14th Street and Constitution Avenue.¹⁴

Despite the Hudson Valley patrician sitting in the White House during this period, the Washington that existed at the end of the interwar years was a middle class town with a

middle class government staffed by employees of modest incomes and ambitions. It was a town in which people routinely bought used, not new, Chevrolets, a town in which Raleigh Haberdasher on F Street could suggest in an advertisement that a man with an office job really should have more than one suit. And when war came, as David Brinkley has pointed out, the need to alter the form of government to fit the expanding function of a nation that defined its security in increasingly globalist terms transformed Washington itself.

A languid Southern town with a pace so slow that much of it simply closed down for the summer grew almost overnight into a crowded, harried, almost frantic metropolis struggling desperately to assume the mantle of global power, moving haltingly and haphazardly and only partially successfully to change itself into the capital of the free world.¹⁵

In World War II, U.S. governmental form and function adjusted to the exigencies of the greatest cataclysm in world history, and the personalities and leadership styles of the leaders. Early on, the government made the decision to rely on what were essentially still private institutions for defense production. The success of that effort enhanced the standing of these institutions. In contrast, the negative experience with wartime government control weakened whatever enthusiasm there had ever been for comprehensive state economic management.¹⁶

At the same time, the political-military direction of the war took its own unique turn. In 1903, the Army-Navy Joint Board had created reforms to encourage the interservice coordination that had been lacking in the Spanish-American War. But these reforms were insufficient for the complexities of high command in leading the global coalition in World War II. Given the immensity of that conflict as well as the need for increased coordination with the extremely efficient British civilian and military staffs, it was not surprising that the United States created a wartime command structure that resembled Great Britain's. But the resemblance only went so far. For FDR's skillful and enthusiastic exercise of his autocratic war powers was only

superficially similar to that of Churchill, who despite his commanding position, worked through his collegial cabinet or war cabinet to arrive at key decisions and only after the most stringent examination and discussion by the Chiefs of Staff and appropriate subcommittees. Such open debate in the wartime Roosevelt system only occurred at the Joint Chiefs of Staff level, if at all. All this placed enormous focus and emphasis on the strategic leadership of one man.¹⁷

COLD WAR

Change and Continuity.

National Interests and the Concept of National Security. While fighting World War II and making preparations for the peace, U.S. leaders continued to expand the concept of national security and used its terminology for the first time to explain America's relationship to the world. The background for this change involved the experience and understanding by these leaders of the massive technological and political transformations set in train by the war. To begin with, the European-centered international system had ceased to exist even as the United States emerged as a hegemonic power that appeared to demand a global role. "The world," John McCloy reported as early as the fall of 1945 after a global inspection trip, "looks to the United States as the one stable country to ensure the security of the world."¹⁸ Added to this were the indelible lessons associated with the causes of the recently ended conflict, particularly what came to be known as the "Munich syndrome." That conference represented for an entire generation of Americans what could happen when nations passively looked on when aggression occurred, as they had in Hitler's initial dismemberment of Czechoslovakia in September 1938. In the coming years, it would be a small conceptual step from the appeasement of the Nazi leader's "salami tactics" to that associated with the "domino theory."

At the same time, the linkage of national security to the primary core national interest of survival had grown stronger. For most of U.S. history, the physical security of

the continental United States had not been in jeopardy. But by 1945, this invulnerability was rapidly diminishing with the advent of the long-range bomber, the atom bomb, and the expectation of what the ballistic missile would accomplish. Given these changes, there was a general perception that the future would not allow time to mobilize, that preparation would have to become something permanent. For the first time, American leaders would have to deal with the essential paradox of national security faced by the Roman Empire and other great powers in the intervening centuries: *Si vis pacem, para bellum*—If you want peace, prepare for war. This, as Hanson Baldwin noted at the time, would require changes in American domestic institutions as radical as those in the strategic environment:

Total war means total effort, and the peacetime preparations for it must be as comprehensive, at least in outline form, as the execution of it. Consequently the effects of total war transcend the period of hostilities; they wrench and distort and twist the body politic and the body economic not only *after* a war (as we are now seeing) but *prior* to war (as we shall soon see).¹⁹

Allied to the concept of preparedness was the emerging idea that national security required all elements of national power, not just military, to be in place in peace as well as war. "We are in a different league now," *Life* Magazine proclaimed in 1945. "How large the subject of security has grown, larger than a combined Army and Navy. . . ." ²⁰ And a year later, this was echoed by Ferdinand Eberstadt, a key architect of the emerging institutional changes in Washington, who observed that most policymakers dealing with national security believed "that foreign policy, military and domestic economic resources should be closely tied together."²¹ This linkage of national security to so many interdependent factors, whether political and economic or psychological and military, also led to a more expansive concept, with the subjective boundaries of security pushed out further into the world, encompassing more geography and thereby more issues and problems. In this context, developments anywhere could be perceived to have an

automatic and direct impact on U.S. core interests. By 1948, President Truman was applying to the entire world the words directed in earlier times to the Western Hemisphere: "The loss of independence by any nation adds directly to the insecurity of the United States and all free nations."²²

This expansive interpretation of national security, however, was not preordained. There was, for example, always the possibility of returning to a primarily domestic definition. One reason was the continued tension in American life between individualism and the emerging machine culture. This tension was not resolved by either the war or the subsequent Fair Deal and was exacerbated by the Republican victory in the 1946 congressional elections that initiated a period of intense partisan domestic politics. As a consequence, much like the 1920s, inflation, strikes, and special interests conflicts buffeted the country. The cessation of hostilities ended abruptly the requirement for a 48-hour work week; and soon unions throughout the nation were demanding higher pay as compensation for reduced hours. In 1946, approximately 4,600,000 workers were involved in work stoppages that lost more than 115,000,000 man-days of labor. Nevertheless, a purely domestic focus on national security could not be sustained, particularly since the emerging concept of national security in global terms increasingly appeared as a major means of restoring the wartime feeling of a common national purpose.²³

That global approach was initially focused on the international economy. Economic designs and economic instruments dominated Washington's early post-war geostrategic thinking. The experience with Nazi Germany's expansion prior to World War II was a reminder for U.S. leaders that European markets, workers, and industrial capacity should be perceived as strategic as well as economic assets, and that control of these assets by hostile powers could increase their capacity to wage war at the expense of U.S. national security. All this was reinforced by the post-war focus on a peace dividend as the Republicans led the popular demand for a speedy military and industrial demobilization. So rapid was the pace that one month after

the end of the war, the Joint Strategic Survey Committee could report that "a year or more would be required to reconstruct our military position at a fraction of its recent power."²⁴ The result in the early post-war period was a military in disarray that appeared unlikely to provide the means for the new Truman government to emphasize the use of force in maintaining the nation's security. Moreover, Republican congressional leaders, despite their increasingly partisan, acrimonious relationship with the President, were determined to let that acrimony end at the water's edge. This was particularly evident in their agreement with the new Secretary of State, General Marshall, that priority should go to the economic recovery of Europe. This economic focus was captured in the aid program for Greece and Turkey and most dramatically in the Marshall Plan for Western Europe.²⁵

And yet within a few years, another outcome concerning the concept of U.S. national security emerged that left, in Ernest May's description, "the military establishment transcendent and military-security concerns dominant. . . ."²⁶ A major factor in this shift was the evidence of a Soviet military buildup. The 1949 Soviet explosion of a nuclear device only reinforced the image of the threat. Equally important, the detonation supported the key argument made the next year in NSC-68 that the U.S. nuclear capability had been neutralized, and that there was a concomitant need to drastically expand the standing conventional military forces of the United States. The Korean War appeared to bear out the assumptions of NSC-68. The result was a massive military increase with the expectation of an indefinite period of intense danger to U.S. national security. Whereas the military budget for FY 1950 had accounted for less than one-third of government expenditures and less than 5 percent of GNP, by FY 53 that budget represented more than 60 percent of government outlays and more than 12 percent of GNP.²⁷ At the same time, the rise of "McCarthyism" made it difficult to question the need for a national security establishment focused on a virtual state of war in peace with a nation

which, as Colin Gray has pointed out, became the all consuming focus of U.S. national security.

The capabilities, declarations, and actions that comprised U.S. national security policy made sense only with reference to the Soviet threat. That threat, as variously defined over the years, was not a factor helping to define the purposes of U.S. policy, grand strategy, and military strategy. It was *the* factor.²⁸

There was in all this a kind of adverse synergism that linked the more expansive concept of U.S. national security to Soviet-American relations. On the one hand, the perception of Soviet intentions affected the manner in which U.S. governmental elites defined national security. On the other, the increasingly broader concept of America's security had an effect on the interpretation of the intentions and capabilities of the Soviet Union. At the same time, the very ambiguity of the new term, "national security," helped create a means for politicians and officials to bridge the gap between domestic and foreign policy. For politicians, focused primarily on domestic audiences, the juxtaposition of godless, totalitarian communism with the promotion of U.S. values was invaluable. For executive branch officials, the geopolitical linkage of Soviet moves to American and allied physical security was equally beneficial. "Our national security can only be assured on a very broad and comprehensive front," James Forrestal argued in front of a Senate Committee on the unification of the services in 1945. "I like your words 'national security'," one senator replied.²⁹ The result was a concept of national security, as Daniel Yergin has observed, that fundamentally revised America's perception of its relationship to the rest of the world.

The nation was to be permanently prepared. America's interests and responsibilities were unrestricted and global. National security became a guiding rule. . . . It lay at the heart of a new and sometimes intoxicating vision.³⁰

Grand Strategy. Out of that vision of national security emerged a grand strategic consensus that the Soviet Union must be contained on the Eurasian land mass. Throughout

the Cold War, this consensus survived arguments over whether the resultant policy should be particularist or universalist and whether the primary threat was the ideological menace of communism or the geopolitical form of the Soviet great power. Even Vietnam could not break the consensus, producing traumatic questions on the wisdom of that intervention but not of containment. There was, however, a price to pay for the consensus. The ability of each administration to remain in office after 1945 became dependent on reducing the tension between the foreign and domestic components of U.S. national security, a tension that was increasingly exacerbated by the requirements of containment. As a consequence, the application of national ways and means to implement grand strategy during the Cold War fell into two distinct patterns oriented on this national security tension. These patterns reflected the strategic paradox that actions designed to minimize cost tend to escalate risks, while those aimed at minimizing risks tend to drive up costs. The alternation between these two patterns—cost-minimization and risk-minimization—had profound social, political, economic, and military implications throughout and beyond the Cold War.³¹

The initial pattern of minimizing costs in dealing with the grand strategy was a natural outgrowth of the cutback in national means as the United States began its traditional postwar demobilization. This approach to containment was favored by George Kennan because it allowed the United States, as he perceived it, to choose not only the time and place of responding to the threat, but the appropriate elements of power as well. The basic requirement of the strategy, he pointed out, was to distinguish between vital and peripheral interests, the *sine qua non* for avoiding reactive policy. At the heart of this approach was Kennan's belief that any attempt to generate enough means to meet all possible threats in implementing the grand strategy could bankrupt the country or at the very least have seriously adverse societal impacts. Political authority might not long remain with a leader who sacrificed national economic prosperity on the altar of indiscriminate containment.³²

The Truman administration officially promulgated the national security strategy of containment in the March 1947 Truman Doctrine. But despite the apparent open-ended, global commitment of U.S. means implicit in that strategy, that administration quickly adopted the cost-minimizing pattern of implementation. The basic problem with the pattern, however, as Korea and Vietnam would prove, was that the strategic premise of making rational distinctions between vital and peripheral interests did not take into consideration psychological insecurities, always a problem in an open pluralistic democracy. Losses of peripheral areas to Soviet domination might be psychologically damaging in more vital ones. For such scenarios, minimizing costs appeared to add the possible loss of deterrent credibility to the concomitant increase in risk. These insecurities, as John Lewis Gaddis has pointed out, "could as easily develop from the distant sound of falling dominoes as from the rattling of sabres next door."³³

The second pattern of strategic ways and means—risk-minimization—also emerged in the Truman years, outlined in NSC-68. That document officially enshrined the strategic objective of containing the expansion of the Soviet Union for an indefinite period until domestic pressures brought the Kremlin "to the point of modifying its behavior to conform to generally accepted international standards."³⁴ But NSC-68 outlined a risk-minimizing strategy based on the fundamental assumption that the United States could generate enough means to defend its interests wherever they existed. Interests, in fact, were a function of the threat, and since that threat could be anywhere, there was no need to accept the risks involved in attempting to differentiate those interests that were vital from those that were not. As the risks were lowered, however, the costs inevitably increased. The decision to respond wherever aggression occurred but to limit that response to the level of provocation encountered placed the United States in a reactive mode, leaving it to potential adversaries to determine how and under what circumstances American resources would be expended. As the United States, in its first encounter with the complexities of limited war, saw the

Korean War drag on, public frustration mounted. With the prospect of indefinitely high expenditures of men and materiel for a type of conflict alien to American tradition, this public frustration began to erode the authority of the Truman administration to pursue its approach to grand strategy.

The Eisenhower-Dulles "New Look" was clearly a cost-minimizing reaction to the risk-minimizing strategy of the last years of the Truman administration. It was also a strategy, however, that Eisenhower believed was the only way to achieve balanced national security focused on all three core national interests. Like Kennan, he perceived that any attempt to generate enough means to protect undifferentiated interests against all possible threats would require a degree of fiscal austerity that would alter American society—that any attempt at absolute risk-free security might destroy what the United States was trying to achieve. For Eisenhower, ever conscious of the tension between foreign and domestic policy, national security and economic stability went hand in hand. He remained convinced that if the American public perceived the cost of internationalism in the grand strategy as indefinite national sacrifice, the result would be isolationism. As a consequence, no one more eloquently than this former professional soldier tied together the domestic and foreign implications of the national security state as it emerged in the long twilight war.

Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed. . . . The cost of one modern heavy bomber is this: a modern brick school in more than 30 cities. It is two electric power plants, each serving a town of 60,000 population. It is two fine, fully equipped hospitals. It is some 50 miles of concrete highway. We pay for a single fighter plane with a half million bushels of wheat. We pay for a single destroyer with new homes that could have housed more than 8,000 people.³⁵

Subsequent approaches to the implementation of containment oscillated over the years between the two

extremes of cost-minimizing and risk-minimizing. These shifts were due primarily to public perceptions of how well each administration achieved an equilibrium between the domestic and foreign elements of national security policy while realizing the grand strategic objective of containment. In any event, even when the pendulum swung toward risk minimization requiring active peacetime forces larger than the United States had ever before maintained, they were not nearly so large or so costly as those that would have been required under different strategic assumptions. Reliance on nuclear weapons caused military planners to be comfortable with lesser conventional capabilities than they might in other circumstances have been willing to accept. Moreover, the perception throughout the Cold War of technological advantages enjoyed by the United States and its allies in terms of conventional weapons made it easier to forego a national security strategy based on matching the Soviets and their surrogates plane for plane and tank for tank.³⁶

Form and Function.

After 1945, the form of the U.S. Government adjusted to the functions required by the changing concept of national security. That adjustment was initially bound up in the American experience in World War II, which indicated that institutions designed for an old era would not be adequate for the new. Post-war hearings on the Pearl Harbor disaster concluded that U.S. intelligence procedures were insufficient for modern day security challenges, particularly with the new American status as a global power. Another legacy of the war was the Joint Chiefs of Staff, an *ad hoc* wartime creation designed to provide some unity of advice to the President and to act as a counterweight in dealings with a similar institution long used by the British military. Not only did the Joint Chiefs still lack formal authorization in the wake of World War II, but there was also increased pressure within and without the military for a major reorganization that would grant the Air Force independent status and unify the armed services. Added to this was the fact that many citizens perceived that

the Pearl Harbor debacle was due in part to the failure of the U.S. Army and Navy to cooperate. Congressional investigations of the war effort also repeatedly uncovered waste and inefficiency due to the absence of interservice coordination. Senator Truman had been the chairman of the chief investigating committee and, as President, supported unification of the armed services as a means of improving "the antiquated defense setup."³⁷

To counter the unification momentum, Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal called on Ferdinand Eberstadt, a pioneer in Wall Street mutual fund activities and a close friend of many years, to chair a committee on the subject as well as post-war organization for national security. The Eberstadt Report of September 1945 directly addressed the expanded perception of national security. "The changing content and scope of the phrase 'national security' is apparent from a contrast of our international commitments and responsibilities after World War I and World War II." These commitments, in turn, reflected "present concepts of our national security in terms of world security." And that security, the report concluded, would require a country permanently prepared with "an alert, smoothly-working and efficient machine," to use political, military and economic elements of national power to meet any threats.³⁸

Instead of unification of the services, the Eberstadt Report emphasized "a complete realignment of our governmental organization" and the coordination by means of these new institutions to prepare the United States for "waging peace as well as war." The emphasis was on adversarial collaboration in national security in keeping with Eberstadt's belief in the corporate, neo-capitalist structures that were part of his Progressive and New Era organizational experience. "Separate departments provide a greater representation of specialized knowledge, they provide a greater aggregation of experienced judgment and ensure representation of varying viewpoints." A "Council of Common Defense," later renamed the National Security Council (NSC), would allow top-level advisers in the executive branch to exchange information and opinions on a

continuous basis and to coordinate the formulation of national security policy. The report also recommended the formal establishment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and a National Security Resource Board focused on the linkage of industrial readiness to military preparedness. Finally, Eberstadt and his committee called for a central intelligence agency and three coordinate, not unified services, each headed by a civilian.³⁹

The Eberstadt Report essentially became the framework for the National Security Act of 1947. As a result, the legislation represented a series of compromises within the executive branch and between that branch and Congress, all of which delayed the full linkage of government form and function in terms of the evolving concept of national security. In fact, there was no definition of the term in the act, and the concept remained one that would be defined through action and, tautologically, by those who exercised power bureaucratically and militarily. Prior to the National Security Act, the unification controversy had helped to stimulate the expression of an enlarged concept of national security. After 1947, the controversy initially held back a more forceful expression of America's immense power. Increasingly, debates by the services took on the form of theologians' disputes concerning holy texts and only strengthened the tendency of each service to create its own defense policy. Until 1950, this interservice warfare used up all the energies of the military not consumed in the efforts to demobilize. The result was that the initial creation of grand strategy to meet evolving national security needs after World War II took form much faster than U.S. defense policy.⁴⁰

As the concept of U.S. national security became increasingly defined in military terms after 1950, there was a growing militarization of the American government and an increase of presidential and executive branch power normally associated with wartime. In the wake of the Korean conflict, the State Department shifted its focus more and more to military security. As a consequence, American Secretaries of State spent an increasing amount of time in

the ensuing decades on issues concerning levels of and arrangements for forward deployed U.S. military forces; amounts of military aid authorized for client states; and in the last half of the Cold War, arrangements for nuclear arms control. In a similar manner, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the intelligence community, focused on the needs of a growing decisionmaking elite and an expanding military, increased in size and function. Presidential orders, for example, created the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National Reconnaissance Office—all placed specifically under the management of the military establishment.⁴¹

There were similar developments at the White House in terms of increasing structure and organizational precedence oriented on political-military issues primarily through the development of the NSC. In the early Truman years, that organization was merely one part of the Executive Office of the President, only sparingly used by the Chief Executive. After 1950, the NSC became the government's principal steering mechanism, with real decisionmaking invariably involving the Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs. That post increased exponentially in importance during the Kennedy administration, reaching new peaks in the Nixon and Carter years when the National Security Advisers often brushed aside the Secretaries of State. By the end of the Cold War, the business hours of the Presidents were occupied primarily with the problems vetted and brought to them by means of the NSC system. And, in fact, as Ernest May has pointed out, by that time "the main business of the United States government had become the development, maintenance, positioning, exploitation, and regulation of military forces."⁴²

With the military focus on national security, the U.S. public came to accept a mix of real and potential infringements on its civil liberties. There were also domestic costs in the effects of the twilight war on government programs ranging from the Fair Deal and the New Frontier to the Great Society. And yet no "garrison state" emerged,

due primarily to the inclusion of nuclear deterrence as part of the grand strategy of containment. As a result, Eisenhower curtailed and then cut the entire industrial planning program extant in the Korean conflict by the end of his administration. The demise of the National Security Resource Board was symbolic of the fact that the Federal Government had abandoned any attempts to keep all relevant sectors of the economy fine-tuned for mobilization and war, and had shifted its primary spending focus on weapons and research to contracting with privately-owned firms and universities. The privatization of defense production remained in effect for the rest of the Cold War. And while money and manpower for military purposes were extracted by the state, the levels remained far lower than those associated with a garrison state and certainly much lower than came to be associated with the USSR.⁴³

Nevertheless, there was an enormous expansion of the armed forces as the Department of Defense evolved. The day after passage of the National Security Act, Congress appointed a bipartisan commission to monitor the organizational changes in the executive branch as a result of that act. The commission's task force on national security was headed by the ubiquitous Ferdinand Eberstadt who submitted a 121-page report to Congress in January 1949 that found the "National Security Organization established by the National Security Act of 1947 [to be] soundly constructed, but not yet working well."⁴⁴ In particular, the National Defense Establishment was, in Eisenhower's description "little more than a weak confederation of sovereign military units."⁴⁵ The amendments of 1949, 1953, and 1958 to the National Security Act were the result. The last amendment represented a concept shared by President Eisenhower and Congress of a strong Secretary of Defense with one chain of authority to military departments and another to joint components. The military departments were to prepare for combat (organize, train, equip) and maintain those forces (logistics, administration, other support) once committed. The Joint Chiefs, with the assistance of the Joint Staff, would advise the President and other members of the NSC and plan for and employ forces

provided by the services to the Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) of the unified and specified commands for the conduct of military missions assigned by the President.

Despite the *de jure* organizational model of the 1958 amendment, the services were unwilling to relinquish their traditional operational functions of planning and warfighting to a joint system. The result was continued service domination of both the force employment and maintenance missions in DoD at the expense of joint institutions, whether in the form of service vetoes of JCS advice or of weak, ineffectual unified commands. In Vietnam, this led to JCS interservice brokerage of budgets, missions, and even targets. At the same time, Secretary MacNamara and his civilian analysts substituted the bean counting of the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) for strategic judgment and began the spread of their own shallow rationalism among their military-bureaucratic antagonists. That a system like PPBS could not substitute for organizational deficiencies and the lack of a comprehensive national security strategy was captured in Henry Kissinger's scathing judgment of MacNamara and his subordinates:

He overemphasized the quantitative aspects of defense planning; by neglecting intangible psychological and political components he aimed for predictability that was illusory and caused needless strains to our alliances. His eager young associates hid their moral convictions behind a seemingly objective method of analysis which obscured that their questions too often predetermined the answers and that these answers led to a long-term stagnation in our military technology.⁴⁶

One result of Vietnam was increased congressional attention to defense aspects of national security affairs, facilitated also by the proliferation of subcommittees and the expansion of supporting staffs. This led in turn to the micro-management of budgetary matters which triggered a similar reaction in the DoD. "The overwhelming focus on the annual budget to the neglect of the longer-term," Robert Art has pointed out, "occurred in the Pentagon to a large extent

because it happened first in Congress.”⁴⁷ On a more positive note, it was Congress that returned to the legislative model of 1958 to designate the Chairman as the primary military adviser, to create a Vice Chairman and a joint personnel system, and to provide the requisite power to the warfighting CINCs. The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, however, did not focus on jointness as the basic organizing principle. Instead the emphasis on joint institutions was designed to achieve a counterweight to the services that had been suggested in the 1958 amendment: the balance between the maintenance and the employment of forces that was the actual underlying organizational principle. In any event, the resultant joint effectiveness of American forces by the end of the Cold War stood in sharp contrast to the situation at the zenith of the Royal Navy’s rule of the sea under the *Pax Britannica*, when Bismarck noted that if the British army should land on the coast of Prussia, he would have the local police arrest it.⁴⁸

The evolution of the Department of Defense demonstrated how the Cold War consensus concerning the primacy of military means to provide national security often narrowed the debate to weapon systems and defense budgets. This militarization of the American government meant that by the 1950s, with the exception of the Secretary of the Treasury, the heads of domestic agencies had become second-tier officials. The dominant positions in Washington included the heads of the State Department, the Defense Department, and the Central Intelligence Agency, as well as the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the President’s National Security Advisor. Over the years, as Arthur Schlesinger has pointed out, these organizations developed vested bureaucratic interest in the military orientation of the long twilight war.

The Cold War conferred power, money, prestige, and public influence on these agencies and on the people who ran them. By the natural law of bureaucracies, their stake in the conflict steadily grew. Outside of government, arms manufacturers,

politicians, professors, publicists, pontificators, and demagogues invested careers and fortunes in the Cold War.⁴⁹

All that notwithstanding, the evolving form of the U.S. Government after the National Security Act of 1947 was a creative response to the evolving Cold War concept of national security set against a backdrop of Soviet militarism, global reliance on the United States, and dizzying developments in nuclear and other military technologies. In achieving the grand strategic function of containing the USSR, the growth of the U.S. national security state proceeded, at least in part, dialectically with the Soviet "total security state." Moreover, those factors usually cited as contributing to U.S. weakness as a nation actually eased the power of the national security state. Despite a compelling external threat, the openness of American political institutions to pressures from interest groups and the nature of national ideology worked together to put very real limits on the power of the U.S. Government over the society and the economy. On the other hand, the often cited strength of the Soviet state inherent in its ability to mobilize societal means for external objectives appears to have been the long-term reason for its demise.⁵⁰

POST-COLD WAR

Change and Continuity.

National Interests and the Concept of National Security. The end of the Cold War has required the United States to think about the concept of national security at a depth not required for two generations. The core of that concept remains the preservation of the United States as a free, economically prosperous nation with its fundamental institutions and values intact. Within the continuity of that core centered on primary national interests, American values and institutions have changed and will continue to change throughout American history. George Washington's "nation," for example, was primarily comprised of scattered agrarian settlements, consisting of people who had, as Washington pointed out in his Farewell Address, "the same

religion, manners, habits, and political principles.”⁵¹ And among the more prominent American institutions of that time was Negro slavery.

The tensions between change and continuity concerning U.S. national security have been exacerbated by a series of forces and trends that emerged in the Cold War. Revolutions in technology, communications, information, and transportation have drastically altered concepts of time and distance in the consideration of fundamental U.S. national interests. These revolutions have fueled a growing global interdependence, particularly in the areas of economics and the environment. At the same time a multicentric world of transnational actors ranging from multinational corporations to terrorist groups has emerged to challenge the primacy of the state-centric world. In the wake of the Cold War, these developments have played out against the traditional tug-of-war between the foreign and domestic components of national security.

The physical security of the United States is still perceived in globalist terms focused on threats that menace the freedom and independence of nations that the United States brought over the years into the “empire for liberty.” The issue of NATO expansion, of course, only highlights the post-Cold War dilemma of deciding who belongs in that empire. At the same time, many of the forces and trends are beginning to produce a more contracted concept of national security in terms of the physical defense of the United States. It is increasingly possible for small and relatively weak actors to strike the United States with technology such as long-range ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, as the 1993 bombing of the New York World Trade Center demonstrated, technologies of low-level warfare ranging from car bombs to computer hacking will also have an impact. One result is a return in part to a focus on the defense proper of the United States—a case of change producing continuity, whether that continuity is with the attempts at continental air defense in the 1950s and the beginning of Ballistic Defense Missile development in the 1960s, or the fortifications of American

ports throughout the 19th century and the dominance of the coast artillery branch in the period between the two world wars.⁵²

In a similar manner, there is the continued linkage in the post-Cold War era of U.S. economic prosperity and the promotion of values to an expansive global concept of national security. Increasing economic interdependence has ensured continued American participation in the post-World War II Bretton Woods arrangements as well as in new regional and global economic organizations. The promotion of democracy world-wide, facilitated by the communication and information revolutions, is linked in turn to the free trade basis for American economic prosperity as well as a general perception that an increase in such forms of government enhances world stability and thereby U.S. national security. At the same time, however, there has been a traditional post-war refocus on domestic economic and social problems, many of them exacerbated by U.S. efforts in the Cold War. As a result, there is a growing public perception of domestic threats to American national security, whether it be the national debt, drugs and crime, or the crisis in education, the expanding underclass and the rot in the inner cities. That this perception can have a zero sum continuity with the foreign component of national security reminiscent of other times in U.S. history was demonstrated in the questions posed by Pat Buchanan as the Cold War wound down. "What doth it profit a nation," he asked, "if it gain the whole world, and lose its own soul?"

What are we getting for . . . foreign aid? Why, 46 years after World War II, are we defending Germany and Japan while they steal our markets? Why must we pacify the Persian Gulf when women walking dogs in Central Park are slashed to death by bums?⁵³

The continuity of the zero sum approach notwithstanding, a changing world has dissolved a great deal of the customary antinomies central to the debate on U.S. national security. Many domestic issues such as economic competitiveness, environmental degradation and

financial indebtedness now have key international components. Nevertheless, an expanded national security agenda will require more not less hard trade-offs dealing with such areas as energy, fiscal policy, and exploding entitlements. In such an environment, denial and rhetoric are poor substitutes for meaningful choices, all reminiscent of a Roman historian's complaint concerning the decadence of his age that Roman citizens "can neither bear their ills nor their cures."⁵⁴ The fact is that there is not an automatic symbiotic relationship between the foreign and domestic components of national security. It will not be enough, Ernest May concludes,

to say that security has a domestic face while domestic betterment has an external face. The choice affects the precedence of issues to be addressed. It also affects the ends to be sought. What makes the nation stronger abroad may not be what makes consciences most easy. Nor what makes life more comfortable. And what eases consciences at home, or creates comfort, may not conduce to making the United States stronger or more competitive abroad.⁵⁵

Grand Strategy. The May 1997 *National Security Strategy for a New Century* reflects the tension between change and continuity in the evolving concept of American national security. There is the continued specific rejection of isolationism as a grand strategy, directly linked to the lessons of the interwar years in which "the United States squandered Allied victory in World War I when it . . . turned inward."⁵⁶ And there is the continuity in the alternative, as President Clinton points out, back to "the start of the Cold War when we chose engagement over isolation."⁵⁷ But it is precisely in the concept of national security in terms of global engagement that the tensions between grand strategic change and continuity emerge. Should the United States, for example, attempt to maintain the unipolar primacy with which it emerged from the Cold War? The urge to be *primus solus* reached its high point in the Bush administration. Since then, there has been a general recognition of the risks associated with such a strategy and of the fact, as the current National Security Strategy points

out, that the United States “cannot hedge against every conceivable future threat.” Nevertheless, that document also stresses the need for American leadership abroad, which the President concludes, “remains as strong as ever,” and the need to “act on our own when we must” in an increasingly intractable world.⁵⁸

Despite this nod to primacy, selective engagement continues to emerge as the principal U.S. post-Cold War strategy, still tied to the three core U.S. national interests and to the linkage of the foreign and domestic components of national security.

We know there must be limits to America’s involvement in the world. We must be *selective* in the use of our capabilities, and the choices we make always must be guided by advancing our objectives of a more secure, prosperous and free America.⁵⁹

At the same time, there is the continuity in selective engagement of the focus on great power war in Eurasia as a danger to the United States. Moreover, as American national security interest in the Middle East demonstrates, ethnic conflicts and regional competitions among minor states matter to the degree that they could cause great power security competition. All this mitigates the “selectivity” of the strategy, since a great deal of the world matters to the United States, and since there are no definitive criteria concerning great power relations in these areas. And even those areas of obvious peripheral interest, if not addressed by the United States, may affect American credibility and thus undermine efforts to pursue more important interests. As a result, selective engagement continues to require a substantial American military force.⁶⁰

This requirement has also led to the continued inclusion of a strategy of cooperative security. Practical experience in interventions such as Somalia has caused the Clinton administration to back away from the conceptual underpinnings of such a strategy concerning the indivisibility of peace. And in fact what has emerged runs strategically parallel to selective engagement—the evolution

of collective security from the choice between sometimes and always to sometimes and never. At the same time, the multitude of new threats has caused the United States to continue to link national security to bilateral and multilateral cooperative security coalitions. "No one nation can defeat these threats alone," the National Security Strategy concludes. "Accordingly, a central thrust of our strategy is to adapt our security relationships with key nations around the world to combat these threats to common interests."⁶¹

This "uneasy amalgam" of strategies in both post-Cold War administrations has internal contradictions concerning the type of global engagement, the means to be employed for that engagement, and the degree of autonomy to be maintained.⁶² Ironically, a major cause is the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act which created the annual requirement for the President to submit "a comprehensive report on the national security strategy of the United States. . . ." At that time, containment was the U.S. grand strategy. As a consequence, the requirement focused on "worldwide interests, goals, and objectives" and on the "foreign policy, worldwide commitments, and national defense capabilities of the United States. . . ." This emphasis on the foreign and defense components of national security was only indirectly mitigated by the requirement to address the "adequacy of the capabilities . . . to carry out the national security of the United States, including an evaluation of the balance among the capabilities of all elements of national power. . . ."⁶³

Since the end of the Cold War, and particularly in the Clinton administration, the national security strategy has also begun to emphasize the importance of America's domestic well-being. But that well-being is only addressed as a rationale for U.S. global engagement in an increasingly interdependent world, whether it be enhancing American competitiveness and access to foreign markets, strengthening macroeconomic coordination, or providing for energy and environmental security. And despite the fact that the term "enlargement" has been dropped from the

current document, the promotion of U.S. values is still linked to a global free market basis for U.S. prosperity as well as to global stability and security. What is missing in all this are specific sections that address the most pressing domestic social and economic threats to American national security, the proposals for programs to meet those threats, and the interrelationship and trade-offs between those programs and the grand strategies not only of primacy, selective engagement and cooperative security, but of isolationism as well.

Domestic politics are changing in the post-Cold War era. "Baby Boomers" are approaching retirement against the backdrop of a massive entitlement explosion. At the same time, a larger and larger cohort of politically active adults will have dim recollections of the long twilight war that preoccupied the United States for two generations. In such a milieu, public support for the continuity of the expanded concept of national security will be harder to sustain without a richer, more complete approach to grand strategy.

Form and Function.

Ernest May has described what happens when form and function grow apart in capitals of nation-states as a result of historical change:

In Westminster, the houses of Parliament and Buckingham Palace—both structures of the Victorian era—and the Georgian and Regency offices along Whitehall are buildings for a seat of empire, not for the capital of a middle-ranking member of the European Community. The drab, modest government office blocks of Tokyo and Bonn seem equally ill-suited, given that they serve the second and third ranking powers of the economic world. None of these capitals vies with Vienna, where the magnificent Hofburg is the seat of government for a republic smaller than Indiana. . . .⁶⁴

This has not been a problem in U.S. history. The form of the American government has been remarkably consistent with whatever grand strategic function has been devised to meet evolving concepts of national security. The domestic

focus of governmental form throughout much of that history was in keeping with the grand strategy of isolationism even when that strategy became increasingly disconnected from the realities of national security. After 1945, Washington continued its wartime expansion as a global diplomatic-military headquarters designed to further the grand strategic function of containing a hostile, secretive, heavily armed superpower. The continuity in form remains, focused in the current period on the continued U.S. global leadership role implicit in varying degrees in all three grand strategies.

For the NSC, there is still the requirement to integrate U.S. foreign, defense, and domestic policies, a need made more acute because of declining resources in an interdependent international system of state-centric and multicentric actors, where issues in all three areas are increasingly blurred. The NSC will have to adjust to resultant changes in the national agenda or be relegated to the status of one—not first—among equals in the interagency process. It will not be an easy transition. In the economic field, the NSC was clumsy and slow in the early 1980s in dealing with debt default by foreign governments—a major threat to U.S. national security. And NSC staff work even approaching that normally expended on major political-military Cold War issues surely would have prevented President Bush's disastrous January 1992 visit to Japan as an apparent tour guide shilling for corporate campaign contributors. One result has been President Clinton's creation by Executive Order of a National Economic Council (NEC) with a national economic advisor to coordinate "the economic policymaking process with respect to domestic and international economic issues."⁶⁵ As the domestic component of national security strategy continues to evolve in its own right, there will be more evolutionary institutional changes that move the Chief Executive further from the political-military focus spawned by the Cold War and Presidential temperament and encouraged by the NSC structure. Such changes may even include creation of a new domestic council as powerful as the NSC in terms of stature and claims on Presidential attention. Certainly the NEC,

despite the normal growing pains of a new institution, has already proven that it provides strengths in a field for which the President is personally held accountable as well as the flexibility in the manner of the NSC to accommodate a wide range of Presidential styles and specific priorities on issues.⁶⁶

Ultimately, it is this link to the President that is the key to how the NSC system will continue to evolve in the post-Cold War era. The executive branch is held together by the President's authority, not, as the Eberstadt Report assumed, in a type of British cabinet solidarity with the President's powers embodied in a committee. Even at the height of the Iran-Contra scandal, neither the investigative joint congressional committee nor the Tower Commission was willing to make recommendations concerning structural form that would curtail the President's function of coordinating his own advisors in the complex business of national security. "Because of the wide latitude in the National Security Act," the Tower Commission concluded,

the President bears a special responsibility for the effective performance of the NSC system The flaws of procedure and failures of responsibility . . . do not suggest any inadequacies in the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947 that deal with the structure and operation of the NSC system. Forty years of experience under that Act demonstrate . . . that it remains a fundamentally sound framework for national security decisionmaking. It strikes a balance between formal structure and flexibility to permit each President to tailor the system to fit his needs.⁶⁷

Like the NSC, the CIA and the intelligence community are unique in U.S. history. America has, after all, always fielded military forces, no matter how small and badly equipped at different historical junctures. But the creation of the CIA in 1947 was the beginning of a large standing peacetime intelligence infrastructure that grew in response to the Cold War and had no real predecessors. Since the end of that bipolar conflict, the Soviet threat has disappeared and no comparable threat in ideology or military power has yet emerged. In the new era, nevertheless, there is the

continuity of the need for intelligence to ensure that the United States is not placed at a disadvantage in terms of protecting its national security. But the expanded concept of that security has also created new secret information needs whether they concern the flow of narcotics and weapons, or trade, environment, migration, and disease.⁶⁸

The key to meeting these new needs lies in the relations between the executive and legislative branches. In the 1970s, after exposing CIA assassination plots and other questionable actions, Congress created the permanent intelligence oversight committees of the Senate and the House as well as a more exacting legal structure for intelligence operations. In subsequent years, many of the recommendations that emerged from commission reports and legislative initiatives were at least partially incorporated either in executive orders or in other executive branch initiatives. It was only natural, then, in the wake of the Cold War that Congress should lead the way in attempting to reform intelligence institutions. "It is clear that as the world becomes more . . . complex and no longer understandable through the prism of Soviet competition, more intelligence—not less—will be needed," Senator David Boren, the Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Panel, argued in 1992. "The answer is . . . to change the existing community, including the CIA."⁶⁹

The result was a congressional attempt that year to pass an omnibus act (Boren-McCurdy) for restructuring and reorganizing the intelligence community—an intelligence equivalent of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The bill caused some debate, but little action, primarily because of the revolutionary nature of the proposals. Nevertheless, changes are evolving in the intelligence community. The Gulf War, for instance, demonstrated how technological change has increased the merger of tactical and strategic intelligence. Reports in that conflict from operatives in the field on the morale of the Republican Guard influenced policymakers at the highest level. And satellites originally built to track Soviet ICBMs provided target data to tactical commanders ranging from pilots to tank commanders. One

outcome was a focus on reorganization that would ensure prompt delivery of spy photos to the consumer on the ground. At the same time, DoD established a new Defense Human Intelligence Service, first used in the 1994 Haitian occupation.⁷⁰

Above all, the intelligence community is beginning to respond in the post-Cold War era to the increased blurring of foreign and domestic intelligence. Analysis and estimates now have to address issues ranging from banking and immigration to disease, climate, and police procedures. This requires more interaction with the staffs of top policymakers and a continuous linkage with a wider array of intelligence consumers to include analysts in liaison offices attached to organizations such as Justice, Treasury, Commerce, and the Office of the Special Trade Representative. One consequence is that the process of classification and dissemination of intelligence is changing in kind as well as degree. Potential intelligence consumers in the new era include law-enforcement officers, businessmen, doctors, and scientists—many not even employed by the government or even citizens of the United States. Another consequence against the backdrop of technological innovations is an increase of threats to privacy. Limitations on those threats which applied when the principal concern of U.S. national security was the Soviet Union may dissipate in an environment where enemies can range from diseases and viruses to the movement of narcotics or migrant workers.⁷¹

It is these types of issues that the executive and legislative branches must address together. This interaction on intelligence matters was created and strengthened by the events of the Cold War. It is a process that continues in the current transition period. There are very few, if any, states that have brought as much scrutiny of their governmental intelligence operations into their parliamentary organization as has the United States. In the end, the evolutionary transformation of the intelligence community from its Cold War configuration is the most practical approach to the difficult task of attempting to

square the circle of maintaining public oversight of clandestine governmental functions.

The intelligence debate has never approached in scope or consequences the deliberations on military reform in the late 1970s and early 1980s that eventually led to the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act. A major reason is that the military reform debate long preceded the National Security Act while major public debate on intelligence reform only began in the 1970s. Another reason is that the rationalization of DoD's joint warfighting organizational form was consistent with the grand strategic function of containing a major power on a global basis. In the full flush of this jointness in the new era, there is continuity along with change. Goldwater-Nichols has not ended the dual role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Despite the fact that the Chairman now has seniority as their spokesman and principal military advisor to the President, the Joint Chiefs are not only service chiefs, but members of the council of military advisors to the Commander-in-Chief. In this regard, the Chairman can cast a deciding vote, but not one that muzzles the Joint Chiefs.⁷²

In a similar manner, Goldwater-Nichols was explicit that the Joint Staff would not become a general staff. As a result, service staffs provide national military advice and views to the Joint Staff at the center of the process on behalf of each member of the Joint Chiefs. It is this input that is the basis for balanced cohesion within the joint system. Above all, Goldwater-Nichols built in an evolutionary manner on the National Security Act, thus precluding any return to the unification issue. Service secretaries and service chiefs are still responsible for recruiting, organizing and equipping forces that bring unique capabilities to the joint table. "Unique" is the operative word. "Remember," General Carl Mundy cautions,

that effective jointness means blending the distinct colors of the services into a rainbow of synergistic military effectiveness. It does not suggest pouring them into a single jar and mixing them until they lose their individual properties and come out as a colorless paste. No army that has worn purple uniforms ever won a battle. Balanced military

judgment and combat effectiveness depend upon service individuality, culture, training, and interpretation of the battlefield. The essence of jointness is the flexible blending of service individualities.⁷³

Progress in jointness, however, will not solve other organizational problems in the new era that stem from reduced budgets combined with the admixture of three grand strategies attempting to deal with an expanded concept of national security unprecedented in U.S. history. The result since the end of the Cold War has been an almost 40 percent reduction in U.S. military force structure and budget while the use of that force has increased 300 percent. The threat of traditional interstate war is reflected in the U.S. deployment in the Gulf War as well as the continued forward U.S. presence in Asia, Europe and, increasingly, the Middle East. At the same time, the U.S. military has been involved in operations against rogue states like Ghadaffi's Libya and Noreiga's Panama while providing forces for noncombatant evacuation, peace and humanitarian operations in areas ranging from Liberia and Guantanamo Bay to Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia. Finally, there has been the military role domestically in combatting the smuggling of drugs, suppressing the Los Angeles riots, and providing relief for major disasters that include wild fires in the west, a hurricane in Florida and flooding in the mid-west.⁷⁴

This type of strain is unlikely to end for the U.S. military because of the internal contradictions in the grand strategic approaches to protecting American national security. Primacy will continue to be part of the U.S. global leadership outlook, particularly in terms of the role played by U.S. security guarantees to the principal World War II adversaries. And selective engagement focused on great power relationships cannot ignore upheaval in the developing world no matter how robust the allied relationships under cooperative security. This does not translate automatically to a role of world policeman. But it does mean that the United States, if it is to maintain its national values and its credibility throughout the world,

will continue to identify its national security in part with the open-ended interest of preserving world order.

As a consequence of this enlarged strategic function, it will not be possible, as the United States did in the threat-based Cold War, to optimize the form of the American forces for a full-scale conflict with the expectation that this capability can deal with any contingency in the developing world that might occur. Instead, DoD will have to balance a force with capabilities flexible enough to deal with a widely expanded concept of national security and the amalgam of three grand strategies that are unlikely to change in the near future. On the one hand, this will entail continuing to maintain sufficient conventional military power to deter symmetrical threats from regional and potential global powers without assuming away the problem under the twin rationalizations of coalition warfare and technological revolutions in military affairs. On the other, DoD will have to deal with new adversaries such as corporations, terrorist organizations, tribes and clans, religious groups and drug cartels. This will require the development of military capabilities that can prevent and defeat asymmetrical threats ranging from weapons of mass destruction and information warfare to environmental sabotage—all posed by these nontraditional actors to circumvent or undermine America's conventional military strength while exploiting U.S. vulnerabilities.⁷⁵

The problem in developing form to meet undifferentiated functions is always cost. The defense budget is highly visible as part of discretionary funds, the latter increasingly in decline in an overall budget that reflects the unwillingness of the American public and its leaders to make hard choices on issues such as entitlements. Added to this is the lack of any real peer threat to the United States for the foreseeable future, and the difficulty for leaders in making convincing links to the American public between world order in obscure areas of the globe and the core U.S. interests of physical security, economic prosperity, and even promotion of values. One result in the future could be renewed focus on more domestic DoD involvement. Throughout American

history, the military has remained the ultimate safety net whether it involved humanitarian relief efforts at the 1871 Chicago fire or those concerned with earthquakes, floods, and other disasters in the 1990s; or whether the military was involved in suppression of riots and revolts ranging from Shay's 1786 Rebellion to the 1992 Los Angeles riot. Against the backdrop of continued social and economic problems throughout the United States, the public demand may grow for the military safety net to be applied to areas such as health and education.⁷⁶

Such changes will only come about gradually through the viscosity of Cold War continuity. Given the global requirements of U.S. national security, the privatization of defense production that survived both World War II and the Cold War will continue, albeit in a more rationalized form. The focus of Defense research and development as well as acquisition is increasingly turning to industries specializing in new technologies. This will ensure that modernization of aging systems will use state-of-the-art technology in pursuit of balance between near-term missions and future challenges. Equally important, what the Pentagon calls a revolution in business affairs is underway in an effort to reengineer DoD's infrastructure and business practices, to include acquisition reform, increased out-sourcing and privatizing, and more use of commercial and dual-use technology as well as of cooperative development programs with allies.⁷⁷

In a similar manner, there is nothing to indicate that Congress will lessen its micromanaging of the Pentagon. Shifting functions in Congress, of course, will affect institutional form as they have in the executive branch. And it may be possible in the future to establish a single committee in each house that deals with the integration of all the dimensions of security analogous to an expanded NSC. Such a committee, at the very least would have to subsume the functions of the Foreign Relations, Armed Service, and National Security Committees as well as the international functions of Banking and Finance. But foreign policy and military affairs are within the purview of

16 congressional committees, and another nine House panels and six Senate panels consider issues associated with both categories. Moreover, working against broader considerations even at the national military strategic level are constituency politics imbedded in structural policymaking issues ranging from military installations to defense contracts.⁷⁸

At the same time, the influence of the military in foreign policy is likely to continue if not increase because of its unique ability to manage and provide for such complex nontraditional missions as peace operations and humanitarian assistance. Added to this is the military's ability to deal with the technological revolution—a revolution that has helped to continue the diminution of the State Department's role in Washington. Advances in worldwide communication, for instance, lessen the ability of diplomats to monopolize privileged, first-hand knowledge, while businessmen abroad increasingly use their own array of resources instead of soliciting aid from their own embassies. Moreover, even as the JCS Chairman's advisory status in high policy sessions has been institutionalized, the reductions in the relatively minuscule State budget have reached a point where it is difficult for the department to even communicate with many of its ever diminishing embassies.

CONCLUSION

The institutional form of the U.S. Government continues to evolve in this decade as the United States continues to sort out its grand strategic functions in a rapidly changing world. This should come as no surprise. At the beginning of the Cold War, the United States changed its definition of national security. But it took a 10-year period encompassing an iterative public and political process for containment to be elaborated and broadly accepted.

America's concept of national security today is infinitely more complex than at any time in its history. The same is true for the relationship between the foreign and domestic

components of national security. And yet there is the continuity in an increasingly interdependent world of the merging relationship between these two components reminiscent of the early years of the Republic when national security was conceived in terms of both secure national borders and a stable federal union. Currently, both the executive and legislative branches are focused on those domestic problems most closely related to America's international strength and competitiveness. Nevertheless, political debate in a period of resource constraints invariably turns to the purely domestic sources of national greatness and, as a consequence, to economic and social problems often primarily concerned with basic issues of equity. The calculated relationship of means to ends is still the essence of strategy at any level. The danger of an expanded concept of national security in an era of competing means without an overarching foreign threat and without fully integrated grand strategies is a public perception of a zero sum relationship between domestic and foreign affairs.

In such a milieu, the concomitant danger is that the U.S. governmental institutions that evolved from the National Security Act are perceived purely as an atavism of the Cold War. National security is too important in a time of change to ignore the balance of continuity. The two-tiered system of national security organization and national military establishment embodied in the National Security Act remains the basic structure. But the real architects of that act, Ferdinand Eberstadt and James Forrestal, realized that organizing for national security was a dynamic, evolutionary process. They expected the national security state to undergo continued adjustment and in fact were responsible for the major 1949 reorganization. Such adjustments continue in the wake of the Cold War within the positive yet adversarial dynamic of executive-legislative relations—a dynamic that created the National Security Act. Although derived from the experiences of World War II, the institutions created by the National Security Act responded to the evolving lessons of the events that occurred after that conflict. The same process is occurring in the post-Cold War era. There is no reason to expect that even as national

security functions are sorted out in the coming years, the institutional baby will have to be thrown out with the Cold War bath water. Formal institutional arrangements, as Alexander Pope long ago pointed out, can adjust in a pragmatic, evolutionary manner.

For forms of government let fools contest
What e'er is best administered is best

The Cold War was a long war that demonstrated the importance of patience, perseverance, and endurance in the face of protracted conflict without prospects of clear victory. It was, however, also a long peace that demonstrated that tranquility, certainty, and predictability are not necessarily synonymous with the absence of major conflict. Certainly, government institutions spawned by the Cold War will have to evolve in order to deal with increasing domestic concerns, and in fact the process is already underway. But the world is no less Hobbesian in nature than it ever was. The barbarians can always be expected at the gate. "Do not confuse *sécurité*, the feeling of having nothing to fear," the author of the *Larousse Modern Dictionary* warns in a different context, "and *sûreté*, the state of having nothing to fear."⁷⁹

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 1

1. Jasper Ridley, *Lord Palmerston*, London: Constable, 1970, p. 334.

2. The U.S. Army War College uses the four broad categories outlined in Donald Neuchterlein, *America Overcommitted: U.S. National Interests in the 1980s*, Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1985, which adds "world order" to these categories. Terry Deibel, "Strategies Before Containment: Patterns for the Future," *International Security*, Vol. 16, No. 4, Spring 1992, p. 82, points out, however, that national interests at the highest strategic level determine ends not means and that favorable world order is a means not an end.

3. Daniel Yergin, *Shattered Peace. The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977, p. 194.

4. In 1943, Walter Lippmann argued that peace as an ideal combined with a long history of "unearned security . . . caused us . . . to argue like the idle rich who regarded work as something for menials,

that a concern with the foundations of *national security* . . . was beneath our dignity. . . ." Emphasis added. Walter Lippmann, *U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic*, Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1943, p. 49.

5. Ernest R. May, "National Security in American History," *Rethinking America's Security Beyond Cold War to New World Order*, eds., Graham Allison and Gregory F. Treverton, New York: W. W. Norton, 1992, pp. 95-97, 104-108. See also David C. Hendrickson, "The End of American History: American Security, the National Purpose, and the New World Order," *Ibid.*, p. 390.

6. May, p. 110.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 111. Robert Dallek, *The American Style of Foreign Policy. Cultural Politics and Foreign Affairs*, New York: Knopf, 1983, pp. xvi, 112.

8. Deibel, pp. 84-85, 87.

9. *Ibid.*, pp. 92-93.

10. The exception to the continuity was Wilson's Underwood Tariff of 1913. *Ibid.*, pp. 99-101.

11. *Ibid.*, pp. 94-98.

12. Robert D. Kaplan, "Fort Leavenworth and the Eclipse of Nationhood," *The Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. 278, No. 3, September 1996, p. 77; and Aaron L. Friedberg, "Why Didn't the United States Become a Garrison State?" *International Security*, Vol. 16, No. 4, Spring 1992, pp. 136-137.

13. Ernest R. May, "Cold War and Defense," *The Cold War and Defense*, eds., Keith Neilson and Ronald G. Hay, New York: Praeger, 1990, p. 9.

14. *Ibid.*, and Ernest R. May, "The U.S. Government, a Legacy of the Cold War," *The End of the Cold War: Its Meaning and Implications*, ed., Michael J. Hogan, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 218.

15. David Brinkley, *Washington Goes to War*, New York: Knopf, 1988, p. xiv.

16. Friedberg, p. 139.

17. MacGregor Knox, "Conclusion: Continuity and Revolution in the Making of Strategy," *The Making of Strategy, Rulers, States, and War*,

eds., Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox, and Alvin Bernstein, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 620. See also Eric Larrabee, *Commander in Chief: Franklin Delano Roosevelt, His Lieutenants and Their War*, New York: Harper & Row, 1987; John Kennedy, *The Business of War*, London: Hutchinson & Co., 1957; and Arthur Bryant, *The Turn of the Tide*, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1957.

18. Yergin, p. 197.

19. Original Emphasis. Hanson Baldwin, *The Price of Power*, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947, p. 18. See also Yergin, p. 199 and Friedberg, p. 111.

20. Yergin, p. 195.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 199. See also Edward Mead Earle, "Introduction," *Makers of Modern Strategy. Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler*, ed., Edward Mead Earle, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1943, p. viii, who as early as 1943 pointed out that national security strategy "has of necessity required increasing consideration of nonmilitary factors, economic, psychological, moral, political, and technological. Strategy, therefore, is not merely a concept of wartime, but is an inherent element of statecraft at all times."

22. May, "National Security in U.S. History," p. 99. See also Yergin, pp. 196, 199.

23. Dallek, p. 158. For national security as a unifying "Commanding Idea," see Yergin, p. 196.

24. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Common Defense. Strategic Programs in National Politics*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1961, p. 36.

25. Michael J. Hogan, "Foreign Policy, Partisan Politics and the End of the Cold War," *End of the Cold War*, p. 236; "Balances of Power: The Strategic Dimensions of the Marshall Plan," *Cold War and Defense*, p. 75; and May, "U.S. Government," pp. 220-221.

26. May, "U.S. Government," p. 219. On the issue of State and Defense conceptions of national security, see Melvyn P. Leffler, "The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945-1948," *American Historical Review*, Vol. 89, April 1984, pp. 346-381; and the "Comments" by John Lewis Gaddis, *Ibid.*, pp. 382-385, and by Bruce Kuniholm, *Ibid.*, pp. 385-390.

27. Much of the FY 50, July 1949-June 1950, budget was due to obligations remaining from World War II. May, "U.S. Government," p. 222.

28. Original emphasis. Colin S. Gray, "Strategy in the Nuclear Age: The United States, 1945-1991," *The Making of Strategy*, p. 599.

29. Yergin, p. 194. See also May, "Cold War and Defense," p. 28; Arnold Wolfers, Chapter 10, "National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol," *Discord and Collaboration*, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1962, pp. 147-166, particularly p. 147:

When political formulas such as "national interest" or "national security" gain popularity they need to be scrutinized with particular care. They may not mean the same thing to different people. They may not have any precise meaning at all. Thus, while appearing to offer guidance and a basis for broad consensus, they may be permitting everyone to cover whatever policy he favors with an attractive and possibly deceptive name.

30. Yergin, p. 220. See also *Ibid.*, pp. 200-201, and 219.

31. For the cost-risk patterns throughout the Cold War, see John Lewis Gaddis, "Containment and the Logic of Strategy," *The National Interest*, No. 10, Winter 1987/1988, pp. 27-38.

32. John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1982, pp. 352-353.

33. *Ibid.*, pp. 91-92.

34. "NSC-68: A Report to the National Security Council," *Naval War College Review*, 27, May-June 1975, p. 68.

35. Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, pp. 133-134. Even in a "hot" war, various limitations normally prevent nations from making an all-out effort to maximize economic potential for military purposes. The primary reason for these limitations has to do with the fear by government leaders of the economic and political costs that accompany the diversion of an increasing amount of resources from civilian consumption and investment as well as of what type of transformation of the state's social and political systems would be required by total mobilization. Alan S. Milward, *War, Economy and Society, 1939-1945*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979, pp. 19-23; and Friedberg, p. 115.

36. Friedberg, p. 117.

37. Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope*, Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1966, p. 46. See also May, "Cold War and Defense," p. 30; and Michael M. Boll, *National Security Planning, Roosevelt Through Reagan*, Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1988, p. 57.

38. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Naval Affairs, *Report to HON James Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy on Unification of the War and Navy Departments and Postwar Organization for National Security, 22 October 1945*, hereafter Eberstadt Report, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 1945, pp. 3-6, 42. The two men first met in 1909 while they were attending Princeton and later worked together in Dillon, Read and Company. Jeffery M. Dorwart, *Eberstadt and Forrestal. A National Security Partnership*, College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1991, pp. 12, 22. See also Paul Y. Hammond, *Organizing for Defense. The American Military Establishment in the Twentieth Century*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961, pp. 203-213.

39. Eberstadt Report, pp. 1-2, 6-14, 16-18, 36-37, 21, 150-152, 163, 181. See also Yergin, pp. 213-214. "National Security Council" was substituted for "Council of Common Defense" in the Senate, S.758, and House, HR. 2319, bills that incorporated President Truman's February 1947 formal proposal of legislation to Congress. On the influence of corporatist thought, see Dorwart, pp. 29 and 104-105. Instead of a consolidated, military system of national security with an emphasis on government control, the Eberstadt Report emphasized that with coordinating agencies there would be "tremendous benefits that arise from the parallel, competitive, and sometime conflicting efforts which our system permits." Eberstadt Report, p. 20.

40. U.S. Congress, *National Security Act of 1947*, Public Law 253, 80th Congress, July 26, 1947, 61 Stat. 495. See also Marcus G. Raskin, *Essays of a Citizen. From National Security State to Democracy*, Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1991, p. 10; Boll, p. 58; MacGregor Knox, "Conclusion: Continuity and Revolution in the Making of Strategy," *The Making of Strategy*, p. 620; Gregory F. Treverton and Barbara A. Bicksler, "Conclusion: Getting from Here to Where?" *Rethinking America's Security*, p. 49; Yergin, p. 219; and May, "Cold War and Defense," pp. 28-35. "In reality the National Security Act was the Eberstadt plan with modifications." Dorwart, p. 145. On Truman's major philosophical and organizational differences with the concepts in the Eberstadt Report and the politics of the report's acceptance, see *Ibid.*, Chapter 7.

41. In 1949, only 7 percent of the more than 10,000 pages of *Foreign Relations of the United States*, FRUS, was located in sections with titles concerning the words "security" or "military." In 1951, for the 13,000 pages of the FRUS, the figure was 28 percent. May, "U.S. Government," pp. 226-227. See also Treverton and Bicksler, p. 408.

42. May, "U.S. Government," p. 227. From the early 1960s, a growing portion of American national strategic planning efforts was devoted to military strategy. Aaron L. Friedberg, "The Making of American National Strategy, 1948-1988," *The National Interest*, No. 11, Spring 1988, p. 73; Samuel P. Huntington, *American Military Strategy*, Policy Papers in International Affairs, No. 28, Berkeley: University of California, p. 28; and "The Evolution of U.S. National Strategy," *U.S. National Security Strategy for the 1990s*, eds., Daniel J. Kaufman, David S. Clark, Kevin P. Sheehan, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991, p. 12.

43. Friedberg, "Why Didn't the United States Become a Garrison State," pp. 13, 114, and 131-141. See also Raskin, p. ix.

44. The Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, *Task Force on National Security Organization*, Appendix G, January 1949, p. 3. Former President Hoover headed the 12-man bipartisan commission. The task force was comprised of an elite group of officials to include former government officials, business leaders, educators, and a journalist, Hanson Baldwin.

45. Archie D. Barrett, "Empowering Eisenhower's Concept," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, No. 13, Autumn 1996, p. 13.

46. Henry Kissinger, *White House Years*, Boston: Little, Brown, 1979, p. 296. See also Knox, p. 620; and Barrett, p. 13.

47. Robert Art, "Congress and the Defense Budget: Enhancing Policy Oversight," *Reorganizing America's Defense*, eds., Robert Art, Vincent Davis, Samuel Huntington, New York: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1985, p. 425.

48. Barrett, p. 13; and Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson, *The Imperial Temptation. The New World Order and America's Purpose*, New York: Council of Foreign Relations Press, 1992, p. 14.

49. Arthur Schlesinger, "Some Lessons from the Cold War," *The End of the Cold War*, p. 56. See also May, "Cold War and Defense," p. 9; Trevorton and Bicksler, pp. 408, 420; and Eliot A. Cohen, "What To Do About National Defense," *Commentary*, Vol. 98, No. 5, November 1994, p. 32.

50. Friedberg, "Why Didn't the United States Become a Garrison State?" pp. 110-111; May, "U.S. Government," p. 227; and Yergin, p. 408.

51. May, "National Security in American History," p. 94.

52. Cohen, p. 25.

53. Patrick J. Buchanan, "Now That Red Is Dead, Come Home, America," *The Washington Post*, September 8, 1991, p. C-1. See also Peter G. Peterson with James K. Sebenius, "The Primacy of the Domestic Agenda," *Rethinking America's Security*, pp. 58-59, 66-69, 85.

54. Peterson and Sebenius, p. 70. See also Hendrickson, p. 403.

55. May, "National Security in U.S. History," p. 111.

56. William J. Clinton, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, hereafter *NSS 97*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1997, p. 2.

57. *Ibid.*, p. ii.

58. *Ibid.*, pp. iii, 13, 6. The four paragraph section entitled "The Imperative of Engagement" is filled with references to U.S. leadership. *Ibid.*, p. 2. On primacy, see Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy," *International Security*, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/97, pp. 32-43.

59. Emphasis added. *NSS 97*, p. 3.

60. Posen and Ross, pp. 17-23. See also David Jablonsky, "The Persistence of Credibility: Interests, Threats and Planning for the Use of American Military Power," *Strategic Review*, Vol. XXIV, No. 2, Spring 1996, pp. 7-16.

61. *NSS 97*, p. 6. See also Posen and Ross, pp. 23-32; and Inis L. Claude, Jr., "Collective Security After the Cold War," *Collective Security in Europe and Asia*, ed., Gary L. Guertner, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, March 2, 1992, p. 24.

62. Posen and Ross, pp. 5, 52.

63. United States Congress, *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*, hereafter *Goldwater-Nichols*, Public Law 99-433, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986, Sec. 104, (a), (1), (b), (1), (2), (4).

64. May, "U.S. Government," p. 217.

65. I. M. Destler, *The National Economic Council: A Work in Progress*, Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, November 1996, p. 1. See also Ernest R. May, "Intelligence: Backing Into the Future," *U.S. Intelligence at the Crossroads. Agendas for Reform*, eds., Roy Godson, Ernest R. May, and Gary Schmitt, Washington, DC: Brassey's, 1995, pp. 38-39.

66. Destler, pp. 62-63. See also Allison and Treverton, "Introduction and Overview," p. 30, and Treverton and Bicksler, pp. 412-415.

67. *Report of the President's Special Review Board, the Tower Commission*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 26, 1987, pp. V-1, V-4. See also Inouye-Hamilton Report, Report on the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, S. Rept. No. 100-216 and H. Rept. No. 100-433, U.S. Congress, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, November 1987; and Hammond, p. 213. On an earlier congressional attempt to establish by statute the positions of both the principal and deputy national security advisors as well as the requirement for senatorial advice and consent for all future nominees to those offices, see *Hearing*, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, April 17, 1980.

68. David Morrison, "The Intelligence Community: Time for Reform?" *Great Decisions*, New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1996, p. 13; May, "Intelligence: Backing Into the Future," p. 37. On antecedents of the modern U.S. Intelligence Community, see Mark M. Lowenthal, *U.S. Intelligence, Evaluation and Anatomy*, 2nd ed., Westport, CT: Praeger, 1992, pp. 6-12.

69. Morrison, p. 13. See also Richard A. Best, Jr. and Herbert Andrew Boerstling, *Proposals for Intelligence Reorganization, 1949-1996*, A Report Prepared for the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, February 28, 1996, pp. 21-26, 29.

70. Morrison, p. 13; May, "Intelligence: Backing Into the Future," p. 37. See also Appendix A, "The Evolution of the U.S. Intelligence Community—An Historical Overview," *Preparing for the 21st Century*, Report of the Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 1, 1996.

71. May, "Intelligence: Backing Into the Future," p. 44. See also Morrison, p. 19. President Reagan's Executive Order 12333 of December 4, 1981, remains the primary Executive Branch mandate governing the structure of the Intelligence Community. That order retains the relationship established by the National Security Act with the DCI designated as "the primary intelligence advisor to the President and NSC on national foreign intelligence." Best and Boerstling, p. 27.

72. Roy Godson, Ernest R. May, and Gary Schmitt, "Introduction," *U.S. Intelligence at the Crossroads*, p. viii; and Carl E. Mundy, "Cautions on Goldwater-Nichols," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, No. 13, Autumn 96, p. 21.

73. Mundy, p. 21. See also Gray, p. 588. While service secretaries and service chiefs still have the responsibility for recruiting, organizing and equipping forces, the Goldwater-Nichols Act sought to introduce a significant change: military capabilities were to be derived from the CINCs' stated requirements, vetted and prioritized by the CJCS, and imposed upon the services by the SECDEF. And the services were to be held accountable. *Goldwater-Nichols*, Sections 153 and 163, and Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr., Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, June 17, 1997.

74. James M. Dubik, "The New Logic. The U.S. Needs Capability-Based, Not Threat Based Military Forces," *Armed Forces Journal International*, January 1997, p. 43; and William S. Cohen, *Annual Report to the President and the Congress*, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 1997, pp. 5-11.

75. Dubik, p. 44; and William S. Cohen, *Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review*, hereafter *QDR*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1997, p. 4.

76. Carl Builder, "Non-traditional Military Missions," *1994 American Defense Annual*, ed., Charles F. Hermann, New York: Lexington Books, 1994, p. 236.

77. *QDR*, pp. 13-16.

78. Treverton and Bicksler, pp. 422-423, 426; and Roger H. Davidson and Walter J. Olesek, *Congress and Its Members*, 5th ed., Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1996, p. 407. The House National Security Committee replaced the House Armed Services Committee. Together, it and the Senate Armed Services Committee oversee the military establishment.

79. Marguerite-Marie Dubois, *Larousse Modern Dictionary*, Paris: Libairie Larousse, 1960, p. 657.

CHAPTER 2

THE NEW MEANING OF SECURITY

Ronald Steel

The most troublesome concepts are the ones we take for granted. This is not only because they are familiar, but because they are imbedded in our way of thinking. They roll off our tongues without our ever stopping to think what they really mean. We come to take them as established truths, like Biblical injunctions.

One of these concepts lies at the very heart of our thinking about the outside world: the concept of "national security." It is central to the apparatus of government, and enjoys the highest priority over our resources and our lives. Yet, like many other familiar terms, it is not a neutral description of an external reality. It is a social construct. It came into being at a specific time and in response to a specific set of circumstances. Those circumstances governed the way we defined the term then, and continue to define it now.

It was 50 years ago this summer that President Harry Truman signed the National Security Act. The very terminology reflected a new American approach to the world, and eventually itself became the justification for that approach. The legislation provided for a limited unification of the armed forces, preserving the Army and Navy and establishing the Air Force as separate departments. In response to enormous pressure from the Navy and its supporters—including James Forrestal, then Navy Secretary and later the first Secretary of Defense, and also Carl Vinson and other influential legislators—the Navy retained its air arm (which it saw as the engine of its future growth) and successfully blocked full merger of the services and creation of a general staff.

In addition to partial unification of the armed forces, the act also established the National Security Council to coordinate foreign policy operations, a National Security Resources Board, and a Central Intelligence Agency. The Act reflected the arguments favored by the Navy and Air Force, which sought the lion's share of future budgets, and of the influential Eberstadt Report that heralded the nation's "new international commitments" and declared that these "have greatly enlarged the sphere of our international obligations, reflecting present concepts of our national security in terms of world security." The phrasing is significant: "national security in terms of world security." No definition is given, of course, as to what "world security" might mean. It is presumably self-evident. Herein, then, lies an indication of how the new concept of "national security" embraced and then went far beyond the traditional notion of "defense." Indeed, it would have been appropriate to have had, instead of a modestly entitled "Defense Department" (which replaced the plain vanilla War Department), a "National Security Department."

Although the familiar phrase can be traced far back, it did not enter the common vocabulary until after World War II. It was first popularized by Walter Lippmann in his influential 1943 book, *U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic*. There he wrote that America's long insulation from European quarrels was not due to any inherent virtue on our part, but a consequence of our protection by two great oceans and a benevolent British Navy. This fortuitous combination of circumstances had, he argued, "diverted our attention from the idea of national security."

The phrase, and with it the entire concept, quickly caught on. It captured the feeling of power and exuberance that followed from the victory over Germany and Japan. It repudiated the discredited refuge of isolationism, and it suggested a far broader involvement of the United States in world affairs. In arguing for policies based on what he called a hard calculation of "national interest," Lippman also added a caveat. A workable foreign policy, he maintained, "consists in bringing into balance, with a comfortable

surplus of power in reserve, the nation's commitments and the nation's power." This dictum later came to be honored as much in the breach as in the observance.

What Lippmann inherently recognized, and what later became abundantly clear, was how broadly the new concept of "national security," could be construed. Unlike the term "defense," which connotes repelling an invasive force, it suggests not just resistance to aggression, but an outward reach to anticipate and neutralize dangers that might still be only potential. It draws a security perimeter that is determined, in practice, only by the reach of national power. A regional power will have a regional security perimeter, a global power will be satisfied with nothing less than a global one. The perimeter expands to fill the amount of power available. And the definition of security expands with it.

For this reason, security gets unhinged from its geographical moorings. It becomes a function of power and an aspect of psychology. It becomes internalized. It is not a specific reality, and it does not exist entirely in space. It is a function of definition, and can be defined broadly or narrowly. Small and weak states define security narrowly, large and powerful ones define it broadly. Security, then, is a reflection of a nation's (or at least of a nation's elite's) sense of its power. It is a powerful operating mechanism, and at the same time an abstraction.

It is striking how quickly the American sense of security, confirmed by the wartime victories and the development of the ultimate weapon, the atomic bomb, developed into a sense of insecurity. The postwar quarrels with the Soviet Union, intensified by a communist ideology that was, in its aspirations (or pretensions), global in sweep—as was, in its own way, the American counterideology of democratic capitalism—gave way to a pervasive sense of insecurity.

Virtually no place seemed to be really secure. Where there were not Soviet legions, there were communist believers, or sympathizers, enemies without and enemies within. Everything seemed crucial, and everything was up for grabs. This new sense of global security (and as its

inseparable companion, global insecurity) was enshrined in the Truman Doctrine of 1947.

Fifty years ago President Truman went before Congress to ask for a relatively modest amount of money to assist the anticommunist governments of Greece and Turkey. But what he got came to be far more important than the contents. The packaging was what came to be known as the Truman Doctrine. There, to legislators who had little inkling of what these modest words would soon justify, Truman declared that Americans must commit themselves to aiding what he described as "free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures."

What few were asked at the time was how he defined "free peoples," or whether "armed minorities" was not another way of saying "civil war," or what he meant by "outside pressures." Just what kind of situations was he suggesting that the United States get into? Truman then went on to elaborate that "totalitarian regimes imposed upon free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States."

Again there was a little problem of vagueness. Which free peoples, and how free must they be to qualify? What is "indirect aggression" and how does the United States propose to counter it? Furthermore, what is "international peace"? If taken at face value, it means a beatific state of affairs that has probably never existed. Most troublesome of all was the key word "hence"—as in "hence the security of the United States" is threatened by the absence of international peace.

What Truman was saying was that threats to free (that is, anticommunist) governments anywhere were security threats to the United States. While presumably one was not supposed to take this literally, what it was intended to do was to lay out a new definition of international engagement, one global in scope and without clear political or geographical definition. It was inevitable that it would

collide head-on with the anxieties of a public unpersuaded of its necessity. The excesses of globalism, and the disaster that was Vietnam, was foretold in the exuberant language of the Truman Doctrine.

If the first problem with the concept of "national security" is expansiveness, the second is its vagueness. In its effort to simplify and to win public support for a global level of engagement, it often failed to distinguish between the vital and the desirable, the critical and the peripheral. It suggested that everything was vital and security a seamless web. But then some things turned out not to be so vital after all, like South Vietnam. Where does one draw the line? If it was not really vital, then how about South Korea, or NATO? If security is to some degree arbitrary, then are interests arbitrary as well?

An example of vagueness carried to its ultimate extreme as a security doctrine can be found in a declaration by the current administration's former National Security Advisor, that the enemies of the United States, now that the Cold War is over, include no less than "extreme nationalists and tribalists, terrorists, organized criminals, coup plotters, rogue states, and all those who would return newly free societies to the intolerant ways of the past." Aside from the welcome news that intolerant ways are now largely confined to the past, one wonders whether there is anyone left, by this definition, who is not an enemy of the United States.

The major reason for the intellectual confusion evidenced by such statements lies, I would suggest, in the unmooring of the concept of "national security" from the more explicit and narrow concept of defense. Defense is precise, national security is diffuse; defense is a condition, national security is a feeling. The doctrine of national security emphasizes the nation-state. It came to prominence at a time when states were viewed not only as the dominant, but as virtually the only action at the end of the Cold War. There are two reasons for this. First, the state enjoys, by definition, a monopoly on military power. The Cold War, for all its ideological overlay, was primarily a contest between powerful, militarized states. But as the end

of the war has decreased the relevance of military power, so has it reduced the importance of the state.

A second reason for the decline of the state is the growing importance of trade, production, and wealth as determinants of power and influence. The central arena in which advanced industrial societies compete has shifted dramatically from the instruments of war to the instruments of wealth. In this new competition, a former military superpower has become a supplicant, and former puny protectorates such as Taiwan, Singapore, and South Korea, not to mention Japan, have become powerful players. In the past the great trading states were, for the most part, major military players as well: France, Germany, Japan, Spain, even Venice. Today the economic giants are, for the most part, content to remain militarily weak.

The governing theoretical model for international relations during the Cold War—the “paradigm” in political science talk—was that of Realism, or power politics. The state was deemed to be the paramount actor, its sovereignty an absolute, and its protection the ultimate purpose of its military and diplomatic forces. States, being considered independent actors, could be threatened only by other states. Since states exist in a Hobbesian world of international anarchy, they must protect themselves from envious rivals. They must accrue military power (or put themselves under the tutelage of a powerful protector). That this may provoke anxieties among other states and make them feel threatened is the self-fulfilling prophecy of the security dilemma. Under these rules security is defined as the prevention of war with other states, or victory in any conflict that occurs.

This is all very well, if the nation-state is the dominant reality of public life, and if it has the ability to command undiluted loyalty. But in parts of the world the state has collapsed (as in Central Africa), or is an instrument of drug lords and local oligarchies (as in parts of Latin America), or is run by a single family or clan (as in much of the Middle East and the Third World). In these cases it commands, not

loyalty but fear, and rules by intimidation. And instead of providing security for its citizens, it actually threatens it.

In such a case, what allegiance is owed the state? The question is not an abstract one. In recent years we have seen the disintegration of established states, such as Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, and the hollowing-out of others that exist only at the convenience of outside forces that sustain their ruling regimes, as in the former African colonies of France. Even in parts of the industrialized world, the state is sometimes incapable of providing security for some of its citizens. One has only to look to the slums of our major cities for confirmation of this sorry fact—or even to affluent areas, with their guarded gates and private police forces, for confirmation.

The problem is not simply that the state is often unable to provide security, which is, after all, the major justification for its existence. It has also become increasingly secondary, even superfluous, to the economic life of peoples everywhere. The export and import of capital, the shifting of hundreds of billions of dollars around the world each day, the decisions over investment and employment, wages and production—all these are made primarily by private forces under little or no state control. Within the economic realm, we are approaching the condition described by Karl Marx (albeit under different circumstances) where the state is withering away.

No longer can any single state make decisions impervious to market forces and market commands: not unless it wants to commit economic suicide. States, like Gulliver, are confined by an ever--widening web of agreements, regulations, and prohibitions that lay outside their control. The U.S. Government, for example, has learned that it cannot enforce against its own European allies, and Canada, its self-declared embargo against Cuba—not even when it declares the matter to be one vital to its “national security”—which it has recently done. If “national security” now means that store clerks from Toronto and housewives from Cologne must not be allowed to sun themselves on Cuban beaches, then Karl Marx has

once again been proven right in observing that events appear in history the first time as tragedy, and the second time as farce.

What is taking place on every level—in the economy, communications, environment, and health—is the decline of the state as an autonomous actor. It will continue to exist for a long time, but shorn of its former pretense and majesty: a victim of forces it cannot control. Increasingly, the greatest threats to the well-being of citizens come not from other states, not from independent actors, but from conditions: immigration, environmental degradation, individual and group terrorism, economic exploitation.

How does the so-called Realist paradigm—which declares states to be the dominant force of international life and the unhindered pursuit of their self-defined “interests” to be the duty of their citizens—help us to deal with this reality? What, indeed, are we to make of the concept of “statecraft” when the state itself is only one of the actors, or forces, that influences our lives? And beyond that, what happens to the concept of the majestic state when its role is reduced to that of a facilitator of private transactions?

Consider the international trade organizations that have become so important in the past few years: the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). These entities are really little more than giant trade groups whose purpose is to increase the flow of commerce. They do this by eliminating government regulations and ignoring international frontiers. Their purpose is to make national governments irrelevant. What is novel about them, and a telling mark of their power, is that they have enlisted governments to do this work for them. Governments are being reduced to the role of traffic cops, ensuring that everyone follows the regulations that are, of course, written by and for the most powerful corporations.

In some places this process has gone so far that the state can hardly be said to exist at all. By this I do not mean such narco-states as Colombia, Mexico, Burma, and Pakistan,

where drug lords rule independent fiefdoms. Rather I have in mind Russia, where the new giant corporate entities (themselves former state enterprises stolen from the people by their former managers and the new Mafia entrepreneurs) control the government and refuse to pay taxes to a state that they consider, quite understandably, the servant of their ambition. In effect, the role of such a state is to keep the population in line, deflect criticism of commercial operations by engaging in military diversions, such as the war in Chechnya, and keep out competitors.

Russia may be an extreme example, but not a unique one. The same phenomenon can be seen, to one degree or another, throughout the industrialized world. What this means is that national security, as traditionally conceived, has lost its meaning. There is military security, which is designed to protect the nation-state against other nation-states. This will obviously remain important, just as police forces remain important within cities. But there is another realm for which it is largely irrelevant: the realm of interests that is impervious to borders. Here the tools are far more subtle and complex, and the nation with the biggest military force may well not be best equipped to preserve these interests.

In this sense, national interest is an important interest, but not the only one. Other interests claim the loyalty of individuals; people do not define themselves only as citizens. In recent years, we have had reason to become aware of cultural sources of identity. Modern Islam furnishes a dramatic, but not unique, example of identities that transcend, and even seek to eradicate, frontiers. We have been told that the conflicts of the post-Cold War world will be of a different nature than those of the past: that the clash of states will give way to the clash of civilizations. Although we need not adopt the apocalyptic conclusions of that analysis, it is clear that states are not always the ultimate objects of loyalty, that societies can be riven from within by individuals whose deeply held social values make their own state itself the enemy. We may think of Algiers,

but we need look no farther than Oklahoma City for a demonstration of this.

Societies today are being torn apart; not only between civilizations or religions, as in the Bosnian War, but also within them. There is a deadly struggle between traditionalists and modernists, between those who have embraced technological and social change and those who fear and resist it. The fault-lines of future, and even present, wars lie not only between civilizations, but within them. In this struggle the state is, at best, irrelevant, where it is not actually considered to be the enemy.

Whether or not war is, as Joseph Schumpeter has written, the health of the state, it is the way by which the state demands its citizens' loyalties and affirms its own primacy. It justifies this by the claim that it is the ultimate, and most reliable, guarantor of its citizens' welfare. Yet there has been an increasing tendency to question the central premise of *raison d'etat*.

The U.S. Senate came very close to rejecting President Bush's call for war against Iraq for its invasion of Kuwait. The expeditionary force in Somalia had to be pulled out when it encountered casualties, and the intervention in Bosnia was delayed for several years until it became clear that American troops would not likely be drawn into the fighting. Even today it is unlikely that the President would be able to keep our forces there if the intercommunal war resumed. Only in the case of Haiti was there support for military intervention, and that was because there was a serious national interest at stake: keeping unwanted refugees out of the United States. The American people will apparently not presently support direct participation in other people's civil wars: not even where considerations of "national security" are claimed.

If wars are harder to justify, it may also be that, at least for the foreseeable future, they are less likely to occur. There have been no wars between major powers for more than 50 years. If the United States and the Soviet Union, for a variety of good reasons, did not choose to fight each other,

what major states can we now imagine doing so—and for what stakes? What possible victory is worth the cost? And what society, democratic or not, would be willing to pay it?

While I would not go so far as to argue that nuclear proliferation is a good thing because it tempers hotheads who might otherwise go to war, the fact is that nuclear weapons have probably saved Israel and dissuaded India and Pakistan from open war. They are also likely to restrain China in its pursuit of great power status, and also other states that contest its right to do so.

There are other reasons why war among major states may be less likely in the future. One is that industrial societies, under the pressures of economic competition and innovation, are perforce becoming more democratic. Democratic states, while not necessarily peace-prone, appear less likely to fight other democratic states than do authoritarian ones. A further, and to my mind more compelling, reason is that the great trading states—those with the capacity to fight major wars—have become far more interdependent than in the past. This is one beneficial result of the global economy. With these economic links come a whole chain of other dependencies, all of which make war more self-defeating than in the past.

If the danger of a major war has diminished, at least as far as the great powers are concerned, what kind of traditional security threats does the United States face. By “traditional,” I mean threats from another state. The fact of the matter is that insofar as we can envisage the future—there is no one out there capable of causing the United States serious harm. Russia is a deeply-wounded state that was always weaker than we believed and that will take decades to recover even a semblance of its former power. For a long time it will remain the sick man on the fringes of Europe: a problem but not a threat. Japan is a mercantilist, pacifist society, single-mindedly obsessed with enriching itself as in the 1930s. It has no higher ambition than to be America’s number one creditor, number one supplier, number one investor, and number one protectorate.

And what of Europe, the potential superpower: more populous, richer, more experienced in the evil ways of the world than the United States? Will it one day be a serious rival? Not likely. Europe—if by that term we mean a political entity equipped and willing to make independent foreign policy decisions involving issues of war and peace—does not exist. Nor, despite the hopes and pretensions of Brussels bureaucrats, is it likely to come into being. In fact, the movement is quite the other way—away from visions of a European superstate capable of challenging, or even being an equal partner with, the United States. Even the effort to create a common currency—let alone a common defense and foreign policy—has proven to be so costly and contentious that it would be surprising if it happens at all. The Eurocrats were overly ambitious and their American well-wishers overly optimistic.

Which leaves China. Traditionally Americans have had a paternalistic attitude toward China, an exploited nation that we felt would, with proper guidance, follow our leadership to the promised land of capitalism and Christianity. Then the Chinese rudely betrayed our hopes, and the smiling little brother became his *Doppelgänger*, the Yellow Peril. Now we don't know how to think about China—as a limitless market or an unending problem.

With its immense population and burgeoning economy, China is, to be sure, a potential great power. But it also has immense problems of governance, of national unity, and of political legitimacy. The world has come to enjoy low-cost Chinese exports; but it can do without them. China, however, if it is to prosper, needs strong economic and political ties with the rest of the world. The government has tied its legitimacy to its ability to provide a rising standard of living for the Chinese people. It cannot do that through a path of aggression. China must be engaged, not confronted. To treat it as a national security threat will contribute to making it one.

If the danger of major war has decreased, what do we mean when we speak of security threats? How will we recognize them when they do not entail the survival of the

nation, or even its well-being? Just as the so-called "other side" has disappeared with the end of the Cold War, so has the old meaning of the word "threat." What once seemed clear is now vague, ambiguous, diffuse, and unpredictable, both in its source and its impact.

Policymakers draw up a long list of potential security threats. That is one of the things they are paid to do. These range from the emergence of another evil empire at one extreme, to "coup plotters and tribalists" at another. But if we get serious, it is striking how few threats from another state the United States today faces.

For all practical purposes, the country is invulnerable. It cannot be invaded. It has no enemy interested in destroying it that has the capacity to do so. It is not dependent on foreign trade, even though parts of the economy benefit from it. It feeds itself. It enjoys allies, but has no compelling need for them—and in fact never relied on them for defense during the Cold War. The United States spread its net of protection, and foreign bases, very wide, but not in self-defense. Because of its economic and military strength, its physical resources, its loyal population, and its privileged geographical position, the United States can afford to ignore a good deal of the turbulence in much of the rest of the world.

There are other reasons why we *should* involve ourselves with other nations, but defense, or national security, is not a compelling one. That is why it is striking that the class of specialists we call "national security managers" has set out for itself the task of global management. This can be seen in a number of policy pronouncements, strategy scenarios, and Pentagon wish-lists, but perhaps nowhere more dramatically than in a 1992 Defense Department document that argued that the United States must "discourage the advanced industrial nations from challenging our leadership or even aspiring to a larger regional or global role."

When word of this ambition got around, the document was quickly toned down. But it was an accurate reflection of an attitude that is common in Washington policymaking

circles today. It came out of the quick fix of the Gulf War, but even more from the way the Cold War ended—with not only the retreat of the Soviet Union, but its collapse and disintegration. Because this left only one great power, it gave birth, not surprisingly, to the notion of a unipolar world led by the United States and dedicated to the promulgation of American values. It was General Patton speaking through the mouth of Woodrow Wilson.

It is sold to the American public in the name of “security” (because the public is not particularly interested in running the world, even for the world’s own good), and justified to other nations by claiming that it is good for them too. It obviates the need for them to develop powerful armed forces of their own, since we pledge to defend their best interests. This is a curious notion, and it is not surprising that it has not been greeted with universal acceptance.

The ones most favorable are the Europeans and Japanese, who see this as a way of avoiding the cost of their own defense. This does not, of course, prevent them from challenging the United States on economic issues, which are the kinds that concern them most deeply. They are content to let us defend them so long as it does not get in the way of more important things. Thus, too, the expansion of NATO, which they agree to because Washington wants it, and because it spares the West Europeans the costly alternative of allowing the East Europeans into their privileged economic club.

This leadership strategy is an expensive one. NATO expansion alone is scheduled to cost some \$100 billion for upgrading of East European armed forces. No wonder Wall Street likes it. And we continue to spend militarily at Cold War levels. Currently it costs about \$100 billion a year to “reassure” the Europeans (though against what is unspecified), and another \$45 billion or so for the Japanese and Koreans. Today more than 50 percent of all discretionary federal spending is still devoted to national security, even in the absence of an enemy. While other nations invest for production, the United States borrows for

consumption—and in the process becomes further indebted to the trade rivals whose interests it seeks to protect.

There is much the United States can and should do in the world, particularly in the economic and humanitarian realm. But this cannot be done while we try to maintain a pretense of global primacy that rests on a diminishing leverage in the military and diplomatic realm. It is time to balance our foreign policy as well as our budget: to bring into line, in Lippmann's useful phrase, resources with commitments, and to take a serious look at other demands on those resources. The American people want the nation to be strong and to stick by its ideals. But they are not interested in grandiose plans of global management.

Americans are not by nature or by inclination imperialists. We are a strong and resilient society that is burdened with serious social needs that require urgent attention. Some of these problems not only prevent us from competing more effectively in the international arena, but also threaten the well-being and safety—that is, the security—of Americans. A national security policy that does not take that into account is inadequate, unrealistic, and unworthy. It also is doomed to fail.

Our primary foreign policy interests are critical, but few. They are to protect the American homeland from destruction and to preserve our institutions and form of government. Beyond this, we have a secondary interest in the expansion of the market economic core that contributes to our prosperity, in access to natural resources, in the protection of our common environment, and in peaceful processes of change in areas to which we are intimately linked culturally and politically. Finally, at a tertiary level, we seek to promote democracy not because this contributes to our security in any tangible sense, but because it reflects our values.

This is a big list for a country with only 4 percent of the world's population and a steadily declining proportion of its wealth and production. If we are not to exhaust ourselves in pursuit of grandiose ambitions, we must reestablish a sense

of the feasible. This is the kind of Realism of which we are most in need. Specifically, we should abandon the pretense of global military control, turn over regional security tasks to the major powers of those regions, end our high-cost and high-risk dependency on Persian Gulf oil, focus on global competitiveness as the prime objective of our military posture, transform our role from that of global enforcer to that of conciliator and balancer, and address far more seriously the other kind of national security: the threats to the well-being of people that lie beyond the competition among states.

Security is, after all, not a condition, but a feeling and a process. It is also an abstraction. We may feel secure and not be so, and be secure and not feel so. We are all vulnerable in ways we cannot imagine and cannot fully protect ourselves against. That is our human condition. So therefore let us not seek absolutes, but instead measure. And let us put security in its proper place, which is a means to a greater end, but not an end in itself. In a real sense it is true, in the words of Macbeth, that "Security is mortals' chiefest enemy."

CHAPTER 3

THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE: THE FIRST HALF CENTURY

Lawrence Korb

The Department of Defense (DoD) is an organization that has been for the past 50 years—and I'm sure for the next 50 years—criticized for doing too much and too little, for not being centralized enough, for being over centralized, and so on and so forth. The reasons for those criticisms are that when we set up the DoD about 50 years ago, the country tried to balance conflicting and sometimes contradictory objectives. First, we wanted to insure civilian control, but at the same time we wanted to respect military professionalism and allow the military a way to get their opinions and expertise into the policy process. Second, while the President is the Commander-in-Chief, the Congress has the power to declare war, to set personnel policies, and to give the President the money that he needs to serve as Commander-in-Chief. Third, many political leaders wanted a unified and very efficient DoD, but the separate services wanted to preserve their independence.

Throughout the last 50 years, analysts have complained about all the fraud, waste, and abuse in the DoD and asked whether it couldn't be better managed. Why couldn't DoD be like General Motors or Ford or any of the great American supposedly efficient corporations? But others wanted to ensure that decisionmakers would have a diversity of opinions. They wanted to ensure that Congress, the American people, and the President heard many points of view. The authors of the 1947 Act wanted the military to act, plan, and budget jointly, but they didn't want a German general staff or a "man on horseback." They wanted the military to be strong and united but not too strong or too united. The authors wanted this nation to have for the first time in its history a large standing, professional, peacetime

military, while ensuring that this professional military maintained its connection to society and to democratic values.

It is not surprising, given these conflicting objectives, that over the past 50 years the National Security Act of 1947—as it relates to the DoD—has been amended six times. There were four major changes and two comparatively minor changes. In the first decade alone, there were three major reorganizations of the DoD. Another change took place in the 1960s and one in the 1970s. The most recent, and probably the most profound, attempt at reform was The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. If you analyze the organizational history of the DoD, you have to look at the first 40 years and then look at the last 10, because the change in 1986 was very, very profound, not only for the DoD but for the American political system. So, as I analyze how we have dealt with these conflicting objectives, I am going to look first at the period from 1947 to roughly the mid-1980s and then discuss the last decade.

Let me speak about the first objective the 1947 Act was trying to achieve—civilian control of the military. Civilian control within the executive branch is carried out by three officials and their staffs—the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the secretaries of the individual services (the Secretary of the Army, Navy, or Air Force). Those of you that are students of public administration know that the DoD is the only department that has departments within it: the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force. The secretaries of those departments also have the rank of secretary just like their boss, the Secretary of Defense. Let me turn first to the Secretary of Defense who really becomes the key individual within the executive branch in maintaining civilian control. The authors of the National Security Act of 1947 recognized, and I think quite properly, that we were going to have a large military and that we were going to be involved in world affairs, because the National Security Act was passed after the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan had already been promulgated. They also knew that the President would be

too busy to spend all his time worrying about the DoD and national security, and so they created the position of Secretary of Defense. This is a very powerful position and, I would argue, the most difficult of all cabinet positions.

Last June I was in New York at a meeting of the Council on Foreign Relations, and I wanted to get back to Washington that night because I had business there the next day. When I arrived at the airport, however, I discovered that the last shuttle to DC had been canceled due to bad weather. Trying to think what to do, I looked out of the corner of my eye and saw Ambassador Jeanne Kirkpatrick also waiting for the last shuttle. We ended up renting a car. On the way back, she asked me about the position of Secretary of Defense, since candidate Dole had mentioned offering it to her. I said I don't think you want this job, because you want to get involved in policy and have very strong positions. The Secretary of Defense is involved in policy but the Secretary of Defense also has one of the largest managerial, if not the largest managerial, job in the world. Secretaries of Defense deal every day with problems that can distract them from policymaking. The position is very different from the Secretary of State. The foreign service is a comparatively small organization. It doesn't have the millions of people who work for the DoD.

I was reminded of this conversation when Bill Cohen, the new Secretary of Defense, held his first press conference. CNN asked me if I would come to the studio and comment on it. I said there is not going to be much to comment on. They said, "Why?" I said because all he is going to be asked about is blood pinning. You may remember this if you saw those videos where the Marines were mashing the paratroopers wings into the chests of their colleagues. They said, "Oh no, no, no, he said he is going to talk about Bosnia." I said, "Well he can say he is going to talk about anything he wants, but the press is going to ask him about blood pinning." Sure enough, he spent all of his time talking about blood pinning. That is what happens when you are the Secretary of Defense. You cannot say, look I am only going to focus on Bosnia today, if something like Aberdeen or blood pinning is

going on and, given the large number of people and places where DOD employees are stationed, inevitably there is something like that going on.

So the job of Secretary of Defense can be frustrating, but it is also very challenging and powerful. The Secretary of Defense is essentially the deputy commander-in-chief. This is a very different role than the one envisioned by Congress in 1947. Since they were concerned about preserving their access to a diversity of opinion, Congress gave us a very weak Secretary of Defense, who was allowed to have only three assistant secretaries and no more than 50 people to help him do his job. We soon found out that that was not enough, and today the Secretary of Defense has something like 15 assistant and under secretaries. Over the years, this has enabled the secretary to become more and more powerful. Interestingly enough, just as a side note, in 1947 it was not even called the DoD—it was called the National Military Establishment. It was not till 1949 that it became a DoD and that the Secretary of Defense began to acquire the power that he needed. In 1953 and in 1958, the power of the Secretary of Defense *vis-à-vis* the individual military departments or armed services was further increased through new legislation. The person driving this was General/President Eisenhower because he felt that the 1947 Act was too weak in terms of the power that it gave to the Secretary of Defense. So, when he became President, he pushed for an increase in the power.

The power of the Secretary of Defense reached its zenith in the 1960s—not through any legislation but through the person of Robert McNamara, who had come to the Pentagon from the Ford Motor Company. He studied the 1947 Act and the 1949, 1953, and 1958 Amendments, and concluded he did not need any more formal legislation in order to exercise the powers of the office. In fact, Senator Henry Jackson and President Kennedy wanted to enact new legislation when McNamara took office, but he said he did not need it and that, in fact, he could run the place with the powers that he had. And run it he did; for better or for worse. (I will comment on that a little bit later.) What McNamara did in

order to get control of the Pentagon was to adopt a methodology called the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS). PPBS leveled the playing field for the Secretary *vis-à-vis* the military because, on the basis of this analysis, decisions were made which did not have to rely just on military experience. Now, the Secretary had an analytical framework that he could use to make decisions.

Ever since McNamara's time in the Pentagon, the secretaries of Defense have basically used their decisionmaking tools and the framework that he established, and have been as powerful really as they have wanted to be. Some of the secretaries that followed McNamara felt that he overcentralized and did not allow the military legitimate input into the process. Some of them decentralized the system, but they still used his particular framework, and it was really up to the individual secretary to decide how strong he wanted to be in running the department.

Until 1986 the Secretary and his office had no real rival, because power had been taken from the individual services. Until 1986 the Joint Chiefs of Staff were very unorganized and preoccupied with inter-service battles. Thus, they did not speak with a common voice. After 1986, a rival power center to the Secretary of Defense emerged in terms of running the department, i.e., the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The service secretaries have been the big losers over the past 50 years. In fact, service secretaries are much like college presidents. They are supposed to raise money for the individual armed services and then stay out of the way, and the Secretary of Defense and his office set the policy. I once interviewed the Secretary of the Army and asked him, "What do you do when you get the budget?" He said, "I give it three cheers, and I send it on its way up to the Secretary of Defense." Service secretaries basically get the dirty work. When there are problems, like Aberdeen or Tailhook, send the service secretaries. They are the people who have to take the heat. Astute secretaries of defense have allowed them to do that, so that they can reserve not only their time but their

political capital for other issues. I once asked David Packard, who was a Deputy Secretary of Defense, how he got along with his service secretaries. He said, "Well I call them in once a week, and I tell them what to do." Now, there have been exceptions. Paul Nitze was a powerful Secretary of the Navy because of the background that he brought to the job. John Lehman was also a powerful Secretary of the Navy because of the decisionmaking style of my boss, Secretary Weinberger, as well as the political connections that he had on the Hill and in the White House (where his brother worked in the National Security Council). But these were exceptions.

Before I leave the executive branch, let me say a few words about the Presidents. Presidents have been involved in dealing with the DoD issues, but only by exception. They basically get involved in a few issues that become important to the nation. For example, President Truman in 1948 desegregated the armed forces over the opposition of the Secretary of Defense as well as the service secretaries. President Eisenhower was very concerned about the whole nuclear strategy and got very much involved in the strategy we called massive retaliation. President Johnson got involved in the anti-ballistic missile decision because it had become a political issue throughout the country. Richard Nixon was the one behind creating the all volunteer force. This was not something that the Secretary of Defense, the service secretaries or the military wanted. Ronald Reagan, as you know, got involved in Strategic Defense Initiatives (SDI). President Clinton has gotten involved in debates about weapons like the B-2, the tilt rotor osprey, and, of course, an issue that took up a lot of time in his first months in office, gays in the military.

Let me move to the legislative branch and discuss how it has exercised its power over the past 50 years. Within the Congress, the two major committees in each chamber that deal with the armed forces are the Senate Armed Services Committee and the House National Security Committee. Then within the House Appropriations Committee (remember Congress only has one Appropriations

Committee), you have defense subcommittees. These committees have been very much involved. But their influence has been marginal. They do add or subtract certain programs. They like to earmark money for particular projects, especially those that please the folks back home. They have gotten involved in certain issues. For example, missiles have been an issue they have been involved in. It was Congress, during the Eisenhower years, that raised the whole issue of the missile gap; the B-2 and the B-70 bombers were issues that they got involved in because of the tremendous employment impacts of those programs. Right now, some members of Congress, particularly Republicans, want to have a national missile defense.

By and large, however, Congress has just pretty well taken what the executive has sent up in terms of the budget and made a few changes—a few more airplanes, a few less airplanes, but their influence has not been profound. The armed services committees and the Appropriations Committee have seen their own power decline with the rise of the budget committees. Floyd Spence, the Chairman of the House National Security Committee, said that he did not know what to do because the budget committee had not yet told him how much to spend on defense and, until he gets that decision, he cannot decide how to parcel it out among his subcommittees. Today you find the budget committees holding hearings on major weapons systems, not just on the total size of the defense budget.

Congress, on occasion, has gotten involved in some other areas as well. For example, they have been involved in promotions. They do have the power of promotions, but they very rarely exercise it. However, they did step in and use this power during Tailhook, when they felt that the Navy did not do an adequate job at punishing those who were involved in that rather sordid episode. They have also been concerned about organization at the DoD. They insisted that certain assistant secretary jobs be earmarked, because they are interested in them—e.g., health and reserve affairs. Congress also pushed for the reinvigoration of the special

forces in the 1980s. In fact, the person responsible for this was then Senator Cohen who is now Secretary Cohen. I wonder how he will like it when folks over in Congress tell him how to run the department. Congress has also gotten involved in some personnel issues. President Truman was one who pushed the integration of African-Americans into the armed forces. However, it was Congress who took the lead in opening up opportunities for women in the military, allowing them not only to increase their numbers but to get into everything but ground combat. Then, of course, Congress did not support President Clinton's position on gays in the military.

This year Congress has decided that they do not even trust the Pentagon—civilians or military—to formulate our defense strategy for the new era. The Congress has appointed an outside panel (The National Defense Panel) to review the work of the Pentagon before they, the Congress, have to act on it. They have put a lot of retired military people on the panel because they feel that retired military people can be more open and honest than those who are serving.

Let me move now to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who have been the major military actors over the past 50 years in this organizational history. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were included in the National Security Act of 1947 because there was a feeling that they had performed very well in World War II. Actually, it was a very loose arrangement. The British showed up at the beginning of World War II and said, "Here are our Combined Chiefs, we would like to meet with your group." We did not have one. We had a Department of War. We had a Department of Navy. There was a heated discussion about who should come and who should be invited. For example, the commanding general of the Army Air Corps was included because there was no separate Air Force at the time. We won the war; therefore, everybody thought the Joint Chiefs of Staff was a great organization, and that we ought to continue it. In fact, Harry Truman, who was no great lover of the military, once remarked, "If the Confederates had an organization like the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, they would have won the Civil War.” Well, as it turned out the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization really did not have a great impact on World War II. Basically they let the Army and the Army Air Corps fight the war in Europe and the Navy fight in the Pacific. General MacArthur had to be taken care of separately. But there was no great unanimity and not much strategic thinking going on.

The creation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was not a controversial part of the National Security Act, however. When it was set up at first, the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not even have a chairman. The authors of the 1947 Act thought that the Service Chiefs could work with the Secretary of Defense in much the same way that the Secretary of War (now called the Secretary of the Army) and the Secretary of the Navy had worked with their military people. But, it did not work very well. For example, James Forrestal, who was the first Secretary of Defense, went over to see President Truman to find out how much he was going to get for the budget. Truman said you can have \$16 billion. So he went back to the Pentagon, called the three chiefs in and he said, “Ok, we got \$16 billion, you guys tell me how to divide it up.” In the meeting, the Army said we need all 16; the Navy said we need all 16; and the Air Force stated that they needed all 16. And all three said we are not going to make any reductions. So, Forrestal, with his three assistant secretaries and 50 people, had to make those decisions. This is why, in 1949, we gave the Joint Chiefs of Staff a chairman. But again, because of concern about the danger of a man on horseback and over centralization, he was not given a vote (and did not get a vote until 1958).

What really hamstrung the Chairman, until 1986, was that he did not have a staff. The Joint Staff is currently a group of 1600 people (mainly military) who are assigned to work for this organization called the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Until 1986, they worked for the whole Joint Chiefs of Staff, rather than for the Chairman. The Chairman did not have a deputy, nor did he have the power to hire and fire anybody. When the Chairman was out of town, one of the other Chiefs

took over and, of course, since there was a lot of disagreement with the Chairman, not many things would happen while the boss was out of town. But in 1986, we created a more powerful Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, gave him power over the Joint Staff and, basically, transformed the service chiefs from a corporate advisory body to the Secretary of Defense and the President into advisors to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Until 1986, it was humorous when the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would come to a meeting with the Secretary of Defense or a meeting of the National Security Council because he could not speak for himself. The President would ask, "General, what do you think about this?" And the Chairman would give the opinion of the Chiefs. The President would ask again, "But what do you think?" The Chairman would either repeat the Chiefs' view or give his own view, and also give the other side of the argument. In effect, his influence was minimal because of the way the law was written until 1986.

Before Nichols-Goldwater, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were not terribly important. In the 1950s they could not agree on a strategy. In the 1960s, to combat the power of McNamara and his predecessors, there was a lot of logrolling or least common denominator positions. It really is not until the late 1980s and this decade that we see a powerful Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who becomes a major player.

Most of the discussion up until now has been about peacetime. But remember, the DoD also has to fight wars. This creates tension because, if you have an organization that works well in peace, it is not certain that this same organization is going to be able to work well in war. In fact, from an organizational point of view, in all of the uses of military force up until the Persian Gulf War, there were problems because of the way in which the DoD was organized. During the Korean War, the Joint Chiefs of Staff basically were supposed to directly supervise the field commander, but they failed to rein in General MacArthur, even though he disobeyed their orders. They told him not to advance toward the Yalu. MacArthur disobeyed, and, from

a military point of view, it was very foolish of him to go charging up toward the Yalu and expose his forces to counterattack by the Chinese. Unfortunately, the Secretary of Defense, who happened to be George Marshall at the time, did not rein him in either. Nor did the President.

In Vietnam, aside from the terrible, terrible, tragedy of the war, the way it was fought and what our leaders told us about it, from an organizational point of view, it was also a disaster. The war was run by an admiral in Hawaii, who was called the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific, even though it was actually being fought in Vietnam. General Westmoreland and his successor, General Abrams, were called the "Military Assistance Commanders" in Vietnam. In his book General Westmoreland says that down in the delta in the southern part of South Vietnam, he did not have enough air power to protect the troops because the Air Force was off bombing in Thailand or Laos. But up in the north of South Vietnam, the Marines had more planes than they needed to support their ground troops. So wouldn't it have been good if he could have moved some of those Marine planes from the north to the south? As a field commander, you would think he would have had that prerogative. But not under the system we had. The Marines said, "No, we are not going. It is our job, we take care of our own." So Westmoreland had to go back to Hawaii, and the issue eventually was referred back to Washington for a vote. From an organizational point of view, it made a bad situation worse.

In Desert I in 1979, the U.S. military was tasked with trying to rescue the poor hostages who were being held captive in Iran. The concept was that we should move Navy carriers off the coast, and helicopters would fly off these carriers over land into Iran and rescue the hostages. The people most experienced in flying helicopters long distances over land are Army and Air Force pilots. But the Navy said they did not want any Army or Air Force pilots on "their" carriers, so, as a compromise, they agreed to let Marines fly the helicopters. Of course, it took the Marines a while to train. Then, when the operation was finally launched, we

needed to get helicopters through to rescue the hostages. We sent eight, and three of them did not make it: one because of a storm that came up, and the plane turned back because the person did not have the experience to fly through the storm, and two others because of mechanical problems. The operation had to be aborted. Likewise, in Lebanon in 1983, we never fixed responsibility for failures in force protection because the chain of command went from Lebanon to a general in Europe and then back to Washington.

During the Grenada invasion of 1983, a less serious but disturbing incident occurred. But it was the type of incident on which Congress had to take action. When we went into Grenada, the Army was pinned down. So a soldier got on his radio to call the Navy to send in gunfire support. There was only one problem. The Navy had different frequencies than the Army because, when they acquired the communications equipment, they felt they would be operating independently. So being a bright young person, he noticed a pay phone. He went over there, got on the phone and used his credit card to call back to Washington and said, "Hey, can you get a hold of the Navy for me, because I can't seem to raise them?" Senator Nunn says that this is a true story; other people deny it. But the fact of the matter is that there was enough substance to it that it got people to want to take action. The result was that in 1986 Congress did something that Congress has rarely ever done, and that is give up some of their ability to influence policy. They created a powerful chairman even though it meant that, as a result, they were only going to hear one military view from the DoD because this chairman would have a tremendous amount of power and be able to dominate that department. Colin Powell came along and did just that. General Powell was to the chairmanship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff what Henry Kissinger was to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. He defined that position in a way that nobody else has, and exercised the power inherent in that position to really dominate the process.

Let me conclude by talking about how the 1947 Act has worked. I think it has served the country reasonably well,

given all of those conflicting objectives that I mentioned earlier. True, it has broken down on occasion, but each time that it has broken down, we fixed it. When the Secretary of Defense did not have enough people to do his job, we gave him more people and more power. When it was clear that under this system, a group of co-equal military people was not running wars very well, Congress even gave up some of their own power. Likewise, there is no doubt about the fact that McNamara cut the military out. But his successors have allowed the military more participation and, with the creation of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, you now have a counterpart to the Secretary of Defense to ensure that that military point of view gets into the policy process.

Many times students of administration focus a great deal on organization and who has certain powers, and certainly that is important. But if you take a look at the history of the DoD, you notice that personalities count a lot. Robert McNamara dominated the DoD during the time that he was there—even to the extent, during the war in Vietnam, of imposing his systems analysis methodology on the operation of the war. And you could have another McNamara. You could have a man or woman walk in there and really run the place, and by the time you found out about it, it would be a little bit late. The situation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is similar. Colin Powell has showed that a chairman can really dominate the process. Not only did Powell have a lot to do with the way the Gulf War was fought, but he had a tremendous influence in the policy process. In fact, many of my colleagues in the academic community have argued that he went too far. For example, on the issue of the gays in the military, it was clear what President Clinton wanted to do. He had made dropping the ban a campaign promise. But Powell basically led the opposition to it. Even before Clinton was sworn in, during the transition, Powell was out drumming up support for his own position, on television. The President wanted to go to Bosnia. Powell didn't want to. He wrote an op-ed article saying we have no business going to Bosnia. Many people

have felt that in doing this, he may have overstepped the bounds of civilian control.

As we look towards the future, that is the thing we need to worry about because, organizationally, I think, we have probably gone about as far as we can. We can tinker with the organization—a little bit here and there—but those conflicts that I talked about have more or less been decided. The key thing is the individuals whom we appoint. I think Presidents need to be very careful about whom they appoint as Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. And Congress needs to hold hearings on those appointments and really ensure that those men and women understand the system that they will be involved in and have the vision to balance all the conflicting imperatives within it.

CHAPTER 4

WHAT SHOULD THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1998 LOOK LIKE?

Morton H. Halperin

Congress created the National Security Act 50 years ago. It was one of the many quite extraordinary accomplishments of that period, including the "Marshall Plan" speech by General Marshall at Harvard and the creation of NATO.

Now we are in a period in which the international situation has changed as dramatically as it changed 50 years ago. This has led people to think that we ought to reconsider the structures that were created then and to ask whether they are still the right institutions to deal with this new set of problems. There has been a modest effort to have the government look at this question. There was an intelligence commission that was established to look at the future of the intelligence community. There was, as I will discuss, a commission which Congress established to look at the roles and missions of the armed forces in light of the end of the Cold War. And all of these studies done by the government, or by commissions set up by the government, have reached the same conclusions, which is that the structures that we have are just the right ones.

One can only view this as remarkable. Here we have a world in which an intelligence community and a military establishment created 50 years ago to fight the Cold War against the Soviet Union turns out to be exactly the right set of structures and exactly the right set of functions to deal with this new post-Cold War world. Suppose that one were to recognize that the world really is different. Suppose that one did not believe that the institutions that were created then are exactly the right ones. What might such a person do to change the National Security Act? What different set of structures might he or she create?

In order to stimulate thinking, I am going to speculate on things that at the end of the day I might not come out completely in favor of. What I want to do is to try to stretch all of our minds by saying let's think as if we are, to paraphrase Dean Acheson, present at the new creation. What kind of institutions might we set up in a new National Security Act?

I want to take the reader through various portions of what such an act might look like. I want to start with the question of the conflict between national security and civil liberties. During most of the Cold War, this subject was ignored in the American government and in the university community. If it was discussed at all, it was discussed as a problem that other societies had. These individuals assumed that, in some societies, because they did not have a constitution, because they did not have an independent judiciary, because they did not have a commitment to civil liberties, there was a danger that civil liberties might be limited by claims of national security by secret intelligence agencies and so on. But that was not a problem we had to worry about in the United States. Congress had put a sentence in the National Security Act, in the portion creating the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), saying it should not function in the United States. That was going to be sufficient. And that's what the government believed, that's what the political science professors taught in their courses, and, I think, that was what most Americans believed until we had the scandals that accompanied Watergate. We learned that the CIA not only tried to assassinate people abroad, but opened the mail in New York City of American citizens and conducted mind experiments on American citizens leading to suicides and other tragedies. We learned that the CIA spied on Americans who were against the Vietnam War. We learned that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had a program for disrupting lawful political activities in the United States by people that either J. Edgar Hoover or the President of the day did not like. We were all quite startled by this, and there was a great deal of moaning, groaning and complaining, and almost nothing was done. There was almost no legislation enacted

in response to this. There were some rules changed by the Attorneys General (mostly in secret) so we were now told that if you saw the secret rule, it would be better than the secret rule that you had not previously seen. But we were still not told what, in fact, it was.

In 1990, I wrote an article with Jeanne Woods in which we stated that we were really at a crossroads; that the end of the Cold War provided an opportunity to finally do something about the protection of civil liberties, because one could no longer say that we had to tolerate limits on our civil liberties as otherwise the Soviet Union would take over the world. But we also warned in that article that there was a danger that things could actually get worse rather than better. And, in fact, that is what has happened. I will just give you one example. Since the Cold War ended, the Congress of the United States enacted, and the President signed, a bill which allows the FBI to break into your home in the middle of the night (or as an FBI agent explained to me once, "we actually do it during the day because people tend to be home in the middle of the night"), steal your papers without telling you that they have been there, and without having probable cause to believe that you have committed a crime. The Attorney General used to do this by his own initiative. Now he goes to a judge and gets a warrant—but not a probable cause of crime warrant—a special warrant from a special court which allows agents of the government to break into your home without knocking, without giving you warning that they are coming into your house, taking your papers without telling you, and never notifying you that they have seized your papers. Congress enacted a statute 2 years ago which authorizes the FBI to do this on the grounds that there are threats to national security that justify such action.

Now when you think about the history of the United States and the degree to which searches, illegal searches, of the colonists were a major cause of the American Revolution, you realize what King George's mistake was. If he had only understood this legislation, he would have simply said that the American revolutionaries were agents

of the French and then it would have been all right to break into our homes without probable cause and to steal our papers—because that is the theory of this legislation. If you are believed to be an agent of a foreign power, then the government has the right to do this. In a number of other ways, things have gotten worse and not better since the end of the Cold War. What we need to do, in fact, is, for the first time, to systematically legislate with a recognition that the United States is no different from any other country; that power corrupts in every society; that secret agencies are more dangerous to democracy than public agencies; and that, therefore, they need to be under strict forms of control.

We need to legislate, first of all, standards of secrecy. It remains the case in the United States that the authority to keep information secret has been assumed by the President. And Congress has constantly refused to legislate its own standards as to what can and cannot be kept secret. So the standard that we have now is an executive order, it can be changed any time by the President. Indeed, the lawyers for the government will tell you that the President can change it by secret executive order and not tell you that he has done so. And the standard does not take account of the public value of the information. That is, it allows the government to keep secret information which may be enormously important to public debate, simply because there is some harm to national security. There is no requirement at all to take account of whether this information is essential to public debate or not. That kind of balancing will never occur unless Congress enacts secrecy standards.

We also need legislation which tells the CIA and the FBI precisely the circumstances under which they can conduct surveillance of Americans, and which adopts a very simple principle—if you are not breaking the law, the government has no right to conduct surveillance of you. If you are breaking the law, the government conducts surveillance of your unlawful activities but that does not pertain to your political activities and the political activities of all your friends. We also need legislation that creates criminal penalties if government agents violate the law. The

Supreme Court has made it harder and harder to bring a civil lawsuit for damages if your constitutional rights are violated by government officials, and we need legislation to reestablish this right.

The last thing that we need in this area, and perhaps the most important, is for Congress to create an institution in the executive branch of the government which has the authority and the mandate to worry about the protection of civil liberties *vis-à-vis* the national security agencies in the U.S. Government. The fact is that there is no such entity in the American government. And people, when they get into the U.S. Government in the executive branch, no matter how well meaning they are, no matter how many articles they have written about these subjects outside, no matter how good their understanding of the Constitution is, suddenly assume the mantle of the positions that they are in. They start giving legal advice to the President based on the role that they think they have been assigned by the structure of the government in the place that they are in. There are no people in the system who think it is their job to say to the President:

You can't break into peoples' homes and steal their papers. That is a violation of the fundamental principles of the Fourth Amendment of the American Constitution. It doesn't matter whether you think the Supreme Court might say that it is OK. You have an obligation, as President of the United States, to uphold the civil liberties of Americans and to make your own judgments about what is required.

There is no person in the executive branch of the U.S. Government who says that to the President on any issue, because there is no entity within the government that has that responsibility. It is not clear where you would put this agency, but I think that either in the White House or in the Justice Department we need an office which has that responsibility and that obligation.

Let me turn from civil liberties issues to the question of the intelligence community. This is one of the areas in which Congress has said we have to do some things differently—so

they created a commission. The President appointed Les Aspin, who had just left the Defense Department as Secretary of Defense, to head this commission. When he died, Harold Brown, who had been the Secretary of Defense in the Carter administration, took over this very distinguished commission. But all that this commission said was that everything was fine. Well, I think it is clear that everything is not fine, because the world has fundamentally changed. I can illustrate it by an experience I had when I was in the government the last time. There is a great deal of interest by the American government in a small island off the coast of Florida called Cuba. The Cubans had adopted a new economic institution called a farmers' market—where supposedly people could bring things that they grew above a certain level to market and sell them, with the government not setting the prices. There was a great deal of interest within the government about whether this was a genuine move toward a market economy or not. And so I asked the CIA to convene a meeting of all the intelligence analysts in the government to talk about these markets and what it meant. And they got everybody together in a room, and the discussion sounded like a discussion you might have if you got 12 medievalists together to talk about what markets looked like in a medieval town. That is, nobody in the room had been to a Cuban market, they all had read a few articles about it, and there were a few pictures which had been taken and had been brought in to show what a farmers' market looks like from a satellite—which tells you not a great deal about how a farmers' market operates. The conclusion of the meeting was that we didn't know.

Then I made what the participants thought was an interesting suggestion: I said, you know there are people who do not happen to be employees of the American intelligence community who are also interested in this subject. Perhaps we could have another meeting with some of them. Well, they thought that was an interesting idea, and they found a building which they would allow other people to go into. And we had a second meeting on farmers' markets in Cuba. All of the first group came, and then we

had 12 other people. Six of them had been to farmers' markets in Cuba. It was really quite extraordinary. They came early in the morning and watched them through the day. They watched them at the end of the day. And they could tell us a great deal. It turns out that if you are there and look and listen and speak the language, you do better than a satellite picture in finding out what is in a farmers' market. Maybe not in counting missiles, but in checking on farmers' markets. They recorded some interesting things which none of us knew. It turned out the general consensus of those people was that the markets were a sham. So this was not a situation where you had a bunch of outsiders saying this is a great change in Cuba, and the government people were saying the opposite. They said these farmers' markets were, in fact, the military selling food to gain a little money, and it was not exactly an open market. But the point is that they knew about it and it was an easy way to find out about it.

I am going to give you a second illustration, also from Cuba, because I happened to work on that, and there are a lot of good stories from there. At one point, people started leaving Cuba in large numbers. You may remember 2-3 years ago in the middle of the summer, they started coming out. There was a great interest in the American government, to put it mildly, as to why they were leaving. The governor of Florida had announced that he did not care what the federal government was doing, he was going to start arresting them if we did not stop them from coming. This got everybody's attention. So the government announced that we were not going to let them into the United States anymore—we were going to take them to Guantanamo. And yet they kept coming. So we were picking them up and bringing them into Guantanamo, and the question was—would more of them come out faster than we could actually bring them to Guantanamo? There was enormous interest in this. We kept asking the CIA about it. They did not seem to have anything to say. One day there was a meeting of high-level officials of the government, and somebody said it looks like the Cubans were not coming out on rafts anymore because they know they will be taken to

Guantanamo. Another high government official said, "Yes it looks like they're finally getting the word." And then we discovered that both of them were basing this insight on the same source. The source was a front page story in the *Washington Post*.

It seems the *Washington Post* had sent a reporter to Cuba who had gone down to the beach and interviewed people on the beach and said, "Are you thinking of getting on rafts?" And the people had said, "No, what's the point? We'll just get taken to the other side of the island." The reporter had reported this very valuable information.

It is clear that most of the information the President now wants about the world is available if you go and look for it. It is available from open sources, it is available from experts who know the societies, it is available by going to the countries and dealing with the people. And yet the U.S. Government relies primarily for its source of information about what is going on in the world on an agency which is dedicated to the notion that the way to gather information is to gather it secretly, from an unwitting source. It focuses on recruiting agents in foreign governments and intercepting messages, flying satellites, and having people sit in Langley, Virginia, analyzing all that information and also looking at public sources.

This is not the kind of information that the President needs and, therefore, I think what we need to do is to create a new research organization—you could call it the Foreign Policy Research Organization or the Central Research Organization, which would be moved from Langley, Virginia, to downtown Washington. It should be put into a building that one can get into without quite as much difficulty as you have getting into the CIA. It should be staffed by people who understand that, for most subjects which the President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense care about, information is to be gathered from public sources with the addition of some small amounts of classified information. It should be an agency which interacts actively with the intelligence community, with the Non-Governmental Organization

(NGO) community, and which produces information for the President from all of those sources. I think we continue to need a clandestine agency that gathers secret information and occasionally conducts secret actions on behalf of the government, but I think we need to do that in far fewer places and focused on far fewer activities. There are not many countries in the world where we still need spies for a long period of time as we did in the Soviet Union. We ought not to conduct such activities in democratic countries. We ought to conduct such activities only when they are clearly consistent with the public foreign policies of the United States. And we ought to avoid giving new tasks to the intelligence community—whether it is interdicting drugs or gathering economic intelligence. This is because the clandestine intelligence community still has enormous secret powers, and these secret powers are not used appropriately, in my view, to deal with problems like drugs or economic intelligence information.

Let me turn now to the military. Here, as I said, there was a commission on roles and missions. It got much closer than other commissions did to starting to talk about the real choices and the real issues. Each of the military services saw this as both a danger and an opportunity. But then, at the very last minute, everybody pulled back, and there was a unanimous report saying everything was fine. Let me suggest some things that we ought to think about. First of all, I would argue that we ought to now admit that one of the major things that was in the National Security Act of 1947—the separation of combat air from the ground forces—was a fundamental mistake. Combat air and ground forces ought to be in the same military service as they were throughout World War II. In other words, we should put the Air Force—most of it, if not all of it—back into the Army and have a single service which is geared to fighting what the Pentagon now calls—in its wonderful ability to create acronyms—OOTWs, which, for those of you who do not follow this, is “Operations Other Than War.” This includes peacekeeping, special operations, and humanitarian missions. Those of you who follow the movement of American military forces in and out of the United States and

around the world know that the military is asked to do a great deal of this, but the military continues to resist the notion of developing forces specifically for this purpose. We also need to ask if carrier task forces are the best way to project power abroad. Another issue is the status of the National Security Advisor. That person does not have to go regularly to the Hill to testify, but there are negative consequences arising from that. The value of regular testimony is that it reminds those officials that they need the support of Congress and that, in a constitutional system, they need to be responsible to Congress. The National Security Advisor doesn't believe that because he is not confronted with the reality of it every day. So I think it is time to raise the question of whether the National Security Advisor should become a confirmed position.

Let me conclude by asking whether any of these changes would matter at all. I will do it by quoting two of our Presidents who seem to go up in everybody's esteem more and more. One of them is Harry Truman who, when the National Security Council was created by the National Security Act, said, "the Congress can create the National Security Council, but it can't make me go to their meetings." And he refused to do so. The National Security Council did not meet until the Korean War broke out. But I think the real insight into this came from General Eisenhower, who was appalled when Jack Kennedy came into office as President and abolished all the structures for making national security policy, because JFK had been trained by people to believe that structures got in the way of creative policy. Eisenhower wrote in his memoirs what I believe to be the correct way of thinking about this issue. He said, in commenting on what Kennedy was doing, "Good organization does not guarantee good policy. But bad organization guarantees bad policy."

CHAPTER 5

AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE EARLY 21ST CENTURY

Robert F. Ellsworth

Our age is undergoing social, political and intellectual changes of totally unprecedented speed and depth. No one can predict the future, but we must try to be the ones who can see “dimly but surely the hunt two fields ahead of the throng.” Only thus can we prepare now to advance and, if necessary, defend American national security in the early 21st century.

Let me be clear: I do not intend to discuss today’s headlines. I will instead consider the larger flow of time and events from now to about 2020 and how we might better identify and take care of our national interests during that span of time.

The Twin Transformations: Geopolitics, and Military Technology.¹

For about 10 years we have been living through a powerful, interactive, double transformation. This transformation is picking up momentum and will probably continue for another couple of decades.

First is the worldwide geopolitical transformation in which the context of American national security is constantly changing. Instead of the Soviet threat, and the murderous ideologies and devastating wars of the 19th and 20th centuries, the international order in the early 21st century will be shaped by new, powerful transnational forces. I mean the demographic explosion in the poor regions and migration to the rich, and the globalization of finance, pollution, production, trade, and organized crime. All of these forces work upon and mutually reinforce each other, and undermine the effectiveness of all nation-states. At the

same time the world is being swept by powerful revivals of religions, and new assertions of ethnic identities, paradoxically backed by certain nation-states. China is emerging as the driving force of an ethnic "Asianism." At the same time a fundamentalist and resurgent Islam is and will continue to dominate the Persian Gulf and the Middle East. National and ethnic pride, as well as religious zeal, can be largely positive—as they were in the rise of Solidarity in Poland in 1980—but religion and race can also bring fear and loathing, not to mention hatred, to geopolitics, as they have in the former Yugoslavia. Nelson Mandela speaks about some of today's world leaders "following their blood rather than their brains."²

Second is a technological transformation in which innovations in computer networks and biotechnology are creating whole new industries—and new instruments to be used in military operations, all around the world. Cheap missiles and complex information control systems could by 2010 foreshadow the twilight of the airpower century with enormous effects on our ability to influence events. Missiles, chemicals, and biotechnology could diminish the American role by severely limiting our access to regions of vital national interest, or even ejecting us from established positions. After 2020, directed energy weapons could restore space and air operations³—but how such a hiatus would have affected our national security in the interim would depend on what we do.

The dynamics of the twin transformations, one in military affairs and the other in geopolitics, could be as important over the next 25 years as were the spiritual, geopolitical, and military revolutions that enabled the West's rise to global dominance some 500 years ago.⁴ The outcome could be destructive and chaotic, bringing savage warfare over wide areas of the globe—or the dawn of a new golden age of worldwide peace, prosperity, and spiritual redemption. A third possibility is a mixed outcome: scattered, short, severe conflicts, with peace and prosperity also distributed selectively.

The double transformation fits what has quickly become the preeminent paradigm for coming to terms with the realities of post-Cold War global politics: Professor Samuel P. Huntington's powerful thesis that the world is engaged in a giant clash of civilizations, and that this clash is remaking the international order.⁵ Huntington defines different civilizations—Western, Orthodox, Islamic, African, Buddhist, Sinic, Japanese, Hindu, Latin American—in terms of different religions, languages, locations, or ideals. Not all these civilizations are clashing, but the evidence confirms that the leading powers of some civilizations—armed with increasingly effective technologies—are indeed clashing and will continue to do so well into the 21st century.

National Interests, National Power.

In a world order being remade by the clash of civilizations, what are the precise American national security interests that can be advanced, or may be threatened, over the next two and a half decades? And what should we do about it now?

We must recognize that America does indeed have national interests in the world, including an extremely important interest in the sturdy legitimacy of the international system as it changes over time. We depend more and more on the international system for our prosperity and our citizens' personal safety, among other national interests. This does not imply that American global hegemony is needed now or in the future—as it was needed to deal with the global Soviet military threat throughout the Cold War. Instead, we need to be both precise and clear about our national interests as the twin military and geopolitical transformations remake the international order.

Henry Kissinger has reminded us that:

Foreign policy must begin with some definition of what constitutes a vital interest—a change in the international environment so likely to undermine the national security that it

must be resisted no matter what form the threat takes or how ostensibly legitimate it appears.⁶

In terms of this dictum, the neo-nationalist, religious, and ethnic impulses behind the clash of civilizations surely appear in themselves ostensibly legitimate; but the political and military behavior of some of their advocates threatens to undermine our national security. U.S. national security in the early 21st century is based, in my view, on five vital national interests, which will continue to exist and can be advanced, whether they are immediately threatened or not.

Vital Interests and What They Require. These vital interests are to (1) prevent, deter, and reduce the threat of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons attacks on the United States; (2) prevent the emergence of a hostile hegemon in Europe or Asia; (3) prevent the emergence of a hostile major power on U.S. borders or in control of the seas or of space; (4) prevent the catastrophic collapse of major global systems (trade, financial markets, energy, and environmental); and (5) ensure the survival of U.S. allies. Many other nations share these interests: in some cases entirely, in most cases only partly.

The United States should continuously advance these interests—and be prepared to fight for them if necessary, preferably with allies whose interests are also at stake but by ourselves if we have to.

A sixth vital interest is entirely up to the United States, and it will be instrumental to securing the first five: to promote unique U.S. leadership, military capabilities, and reputation for adherence to clear U.S. commitments and even-handedness in dealing with other states and people.

Important Interests and What They Require. America has many other national interests than these vital ones, but I believe it is important in discussing national security in the early 21st century to have a clear and discriminate public sense of which specific national interests are vital and should therefore be the touchstone of American national security policy. National interests which are

extremely important but not vital should also be promoted, but threats to them would require the United States to commit forces only with a coalition of allies whose vital interests are themselves threatened. National interests which are just important would require us to participate militarily but only if the costs are low or others carry the lion's share of the burden.⁷ Within that frame of reference we can prepare our policies and our posture accordingly.

The Cascade of Changes in the World.

We have the moral and material strength to take care of our vital interests and of our important ones, but it would be immoral and dangerous for us to launch or sustain a crusade. I am reminded of a conversation among Richard Nixon, General Vladimir Kryuchkov (then head of the KGB), and myself in Moscow. It was late March 1991, the spring before the December collapse of the Soviet Union. We were in Kryuchkov's office on the fourth floor of the Lyubyanka Building on Dzerzhinsky Square. Kryuchkov said:

The role of the United States in the world is more important than ever, but there is a danger. The leading role is a heavy burden; it can break even a strong state. There was a time when we thought we could press the imperialists and at the same time have our way with China and in the Third World. We thought we held God by the beard, but soon we realized the burden was beyond our endurance. Beware.

At the time of the conversation with Kryuchkov in 1991, the distribution of wealth and power and military competence in the world was already changing radically and rapidly. Since then, it has changed even more. Three events in the late 1970s and early 1980s had begun a cascade of changes that have now restructured the international system as we have known it. Those events were: the 1978 coming to power of Deng Xiaoping and his rapid decision to open China to the world; the 1979 Islamic takeover of Iran; and the 1985 coming to power of Mikhail Gorbachev in Moscow. At about the same time, modern

missiles, precision surveillance and control, and stealth technologies began to come into wider use. Since then, through the 1980s and 1990s the Chinese economy has grown to awesome proportions and has become a huge consumer of energy as well as a huge market for world trade and investment; the Islamic resurgence has spread from Tehran in all directions and today virtually controls the world's energy heartland; and the Soviet Union has collapsed while Russia is still seeking its domestic political footing and may emerge to become the new, northern leg of the world's energy heartland by 2020.

The Opening of China and its Consequences. Over the past few years the United States has told North Korea how it should or should not arm itself, told Japan how it should organize its economy, told China how it should treat its own citizens, and told both China and Singapore how they should treat American citizens. In most of these cases, the United States either lost the issue or was forced to back down very substantially. This reflects the shifting balance of power between the United States and Asia. This shift is partly due to China's successful exploitation, beginning in 1978 under Deng Xiaoping, of President Nixon's strategic opening to China in 1972.

When he died, Deng had directed that his ashes be, and they were, scattered at sea rather than in China's great rivers, to signify his openness to the world. As Roderick MacFarquhar points out, Deng made China "accessible to foreign ideas and influences in a manner unprecedented since the Tang dynasty in the seventh century AD."⁸ China's economic role in the world has become enormously important and is beginning to provide China with the means to deal with their huge internal challenges and at the same time to reach for real military power.

China is already the recipient of more foreign direct investment than any other country in the world except the United States. Their economy is as large as Japan's by some measures, although with a population of 1.2 billion versus Japan's 125 million, China's per capita economy is much lower.

China's population is growing by another 125 million—another Japan—every 7-8 years, and every year 20 million unemployed Chinese from the interior are “sweeping to the sea,” as the Chinese in Beijing put it.

China's economy is forecast to continue to grow to within shouting distance of the U.S. economy in a little over 10 years' time,⁹ and will help the Chinese to deal with these challenges; but the psychological effects on Americans, who have had the world's largest economy since about 1912, will require adjustments in our own self-perceptions. Politics in China for the foreseeable future will be shaped by the tensions between the effort to prop up the doomed Leninist state, and the imperative to allow pluralism, decentralization, and economic growth to continue on the course set by Deng.

China's military will play a critical role in the working out of these internal tensions, as General Xiong Guangkai told me when I visited him in Beijing recently. For both internal and external purposes, their budget is growing rapidly, though from a low base, and could in a few years' time be very substantial.

Chinese military authorities today write of “ways to defeat a powerful opponent with weak forces in a high-tech war,” and of how “technology increases the importance of preemptive strikes or first strikes. . . .”¹⁰ Even with the capabilities they may acquire in the early 21st century, however, China's intentions are not comparable and its capabilities will not be comparable to those of the Soviet Union in the Cold War. The “local war” school of thought is the dominant school in China: it cancels Mao's requirement to prepare for a global war. As Michael Pillsbury points out, “local” in Chinese means regional, partial, sectional, or local, all at the same time.¹¹ Because the Chinese focus on rapid, decisive action for local advantage, their approach can be quite destabilizing in a very large “local” area—East Asia—where both they and the United States have vital national interests. The world got a taste of such strategy—and its effects—in China's March 1996 Taiwan Strait Exercise, which I will come back to later.

As Liu Huaqui, the Chinese Premier's and State Council's foreign affairs adviser indicated to Pillsbury and me at a private dinner in the Diaoyutai State Guest House in Beijing a year ago, the Chinese leadership knows we have national interests as well as influence, allies, and real power in Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and the South China Sea. They know we have established these interests by outpourings of American blood and treasure over 4 decades, but I am not sure that the present Chinese leadership accords much weight to those factors.

The South China Sea will be an increasingly important national interest to China because it seems to them to be their best local source of energy (other than coal). The Chinese regime's very legitimacy depends on economic growth and that will require—for industrial use alone—an increase from about 450 million tons of oil (TOE) equivalent in 1995 to as much as 950 TOE in 2005.¹² We, too, have extremely important interests in the South China Sea: mainly freedom of navigation for energy from the Persian Gulf to East Asia (China will share that interest), and access for our Seventh Fleet from its Pacific locations to the Gulf. Beijing is also looking at East Siberia as a possible source of natural gas.

Important and contentious as those matters are, in my view, the Taiwan question will be the most difficult East Asia question in the years to come. It may come to be the most vexing political-military question in the world. Both sides see China as "One China." But each side sees the terms and conditions very differently. The question is linked in Beijing's analyses to our strategic ally, Japan, which occupied Taiwan between 1895 and 1945. Japan also occupied and brutally exploited China in the 1930s and 1940s. The Chinese fear Japan as a possible "perfect" military superpower in the early 21st Century. The Taiwan question is also affected by Beijing's "pay-back" attitude against the West for what the Chinese feel as 150 years' humiliation since the Opium Wars and the 1842 Treaty of Nanking. More specifically, the post-Deng leadership is to some extent hostage to the Taiwan question. Taiwan

independence would wreck the regime and bring either chaos or reinvigorated authoritarianism. "Healing the wound" would reduce anxieties on both sides of the Strait, and could possibly inspire transformation of the regime in Beijing in a more open and accountable direction.

China used its modest military capabilities in the March 1996 Taiwan Strait Exercise in a sophisticated and effective way to cut down on the vote of the Taiwan independence party in Taiwan's mid-March Presidential election. They fired M-9 ballistic missiles into the sea near Taiwan, exercised elements of eight infantry divisions along the mainland coast, deployed naval battle units in the western part of the Strait, flew mock combat missions with IL-76 and SU-27 aircraft, and deployed SA-10B SAMs.¹³

As everyone (including China's leadership) has noted, however, the Taiwan Strait Exercise also shook up East Asia by provoking the rapid deployment of the *Nimitz* and *Independence* carrier battle groups to the area, reinforcing the U.S.-Japan strategic alliance, and helping stimulate planning for the largest joint U.S.-Australia-New Zealand exercise involving ANZUS troops since World War II. It has energized the independence movement on Taiwan, as I noticed when I attended the festive inaugural of President Li Teng-hui in Taipei. This Spring a Taiwan "National Development Conference" decided that "the two sides are two equal political entities." The ruling Kuomintang also spoke of "two equal political entities."¹⁴ This is a new formulation of the conventional "two systems" concept. None of these reactions could have been welcome to Beijing's leaders.

As for America's role: Taiwan today is more democratic, more capitalist, and more deeply embedded in the international system than it was in 1972 at the time of the United States' acceptance of the "One China" claims, spelled out in the Shanghai Communiqué, or in 1979 when President Carter established formal diplomatic ties with China and confirmed that acceptance, or in 1982 when President Reagan reconfirmed America's acceptance of the claims of "One China." These triple acceptances do not

commit the United States to go to war to defend a renegade Taiwan, but we are committed to prevent a violent takeover by China—as Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich made clear to Chinese leaders recently. U.S. policy has remained ambiguous for 25 years, while the twin transformations of geopolitics and technology have swept both sides of the Taiwan Strait. The interactive dynamics of the Taiwan question could, over the next 10 years or so, lead to unwanted war—or to the peaceful entry of China into the international system on prudential terms. U.S. vital and important interests can be advanced and defended by insuring the latter.

Important as China is, it is far from being the only challenge or opportunity in East Asia for American national security in the early 21st century. Japan, Korea, the Asian part of Russia, Southeast Asia—and China—look at each other as strategic, economic, and political competitors. None considers America to be its principal security threat. All depend on access to the American market and American capital. Many feel dependent on the United States for their security. So America is in a unique position in Asia. We can afford to, and should, have friendly relations with all Asian countries. At critical moments we can throw our weight in the direction which is seen to be the pacesetter in the worldwide revolution in military affairs.

The Islamic Takeover of Iran and its Consequences. Without pausing to analyze all the causes of the fundamentalist Islamic resurgence that has been gathering momentum since the 1979 Khomeini revolution in Iran, it is necessary to understand that it has affected every Islamic country, that it is to some extent a reaction against the modernizing power of the West, and that in the process Islam has become heavily politicized. Islamic fundamentalism has come to signify, in different ways in different places, extremism and expansion.

I respect Islam as a religion: its rigorous and disciplined scripturalism sets an admirable standard, and its higher theology and redemptive spiritual strengths are beyond question. But as the great cultural anthropologist Ernest

Gellner has pointed out, Islam has evolved into a rigid and anti-rational theocracy.¹⁵ Ambitious clergymen, ecstatic theologians, and political ideologues have come to dominate the masses—and many of the higher clergy have been co-opted. As Huntington has written, political Islam is also fueled by demographics: “For years to come, Muslim populations will be disproportionately young . . . teenagers and people in their twenties.”¹⁶ The resulting turbulence will continue to disrupt both Islamic societies and their neighbors well into the 21st century. This is nothing new: “The off-and-on-again conflict between Islam and the West has existed for centuries . . .”¹⁷

Fundamentalists—who now control Iran, pursue campaigns of violence in Egypt, are influential in Libya, and may soon control Algeria—also enjoy the support of several governments and the deference of many (including that of Saudi Arabia). They may continue to threaten our vital national interests for several more decades: specifically, (a) our interest that there be no curtailment in energy supplies to the world (U.S. imports from the Persian Gulf are now at least 10 percent of our total consumption and growing, and East Asia heavily depends on imports from the Gulf), and (b) our interest in the national security of our European and Middle Eastern allies.

Powers in the region have noted the shortcomings of Iraq’s military efforts in DESERT SHIELD/STORM, and are responding by acquiring ballistic and cruise missiles—and high-performance, anti-air and air-to-air missiles with associated C⁴ISR (command, control, communication, computer, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) systems. In the foreseeable future, they could be able to deny access to us, and directly threaten our allies. They will also be increasingly able to threaten us in our established positions, as they did in the Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia in the summer of 1996.

Both Iran and Libya (which may already have, or have access to, nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons) are reported to be eager to buy the Nodong and the Taepo Dong-2 ballistic missiles from North Korea when (and if) they are

available. The Nodong would put Israel in range from Iran and parts of Southern Europe from Libya. From Libya, the Taepo Dong-2 could reach London, Berlin and Moscow.¹⁸ The threat of such ballistic missiles, and stealthy cruise missiles—or large fleets of upgraded SCUDs which in small numbers and primitive models were so troublesome in DESERT STORM—are already beginning to affect perceptions of the balance of power in the Middle East.

These threats engage the nuclear issue, East Asia, the oil issue and our alliances—and therefore vital American national interests—well into the 21st century. The challenge for U.S. national security policy is to resist this dangerous trend early enough and in a form that is effective enough to push the ultimate threats further and further into the future. This should include a well-coordinated international buildup of oil stockpiles as buffers against supply discontinuities. The specific challenge for U.S. and allied military planners is to develop more effective counters to the rising missile threat than seem to be possible from the active defenses that have received so much U.S. money and attention in the past. In March 1997, the U.S. Commander-in-Chief, Europe, General Joulwan, testified that defenses against ballistic and cruise missiles are “inadequate to meet the challenges of the future.”¹⁹ An effective system will necessarily include air-borne (and ultimately space-based) laser systems, new forms and structures of deterrence, and multidimensional preemption systems.

The Collapse of the Soviet Union and its Consequences. Although we have a tendency to hold a mental image of Russia as the successor to the Soviet Union in geopolitics, that is misleading. The government of Russia enjoys only limited political legitimacy at home and, despite the rhetoric of its brilliant foreign minister, Yevgeny Primakov, lacks the ability to project political, economic, or military power beyond its “near abroad.” Even in its “near abroad,” Moscow’s writ is weak. The countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) actually value their relations with the United States so highly that Moscow finds it helpful when dealing with them to display its own good

relations with Washington. The proliferation of Russian weapons and skills to criminals, insurgents and terrorists, and rapid further military fragmentation, pose a far more immediate international danger than notional Russian military aggression anywhere.

At the same time, Russian companies are becoming increasingly active participants in the global economy. This is particularly evident in the energy and mining sectors, but rising Russian steel and arms exports, the purchase of a number of Western brokerage houses, the joint venture of Khrunichev and RSC Energia with Lockheed Martin to provide space launches with Russia's Proton rockets, and the listing of Russian telecommunications and oil and gas company stocks on the New York Stock Exchange are also indicative. Promstroybank, one of Russia's largest, has opened an office on Park Avenue in New York. Far from confining their activities to the private sector, moreover, the so-called "new Russians" are becoming increasingly influential in government policy, including not only economic but also security and foreign policy.²⁰

Looking a quarter century ahead ("two fields ahead of the throng"), it is in our interest to help restore control of nuclear weapons and weapons material²¹ and enforce the Non-Proliferation Treaty—and to work toward a cooperative future Russian role in dealing with the shift of the world balance toward Asia, and the persistence of militant and military Islam. As World War II drew to a close, the U.S. Air Force planned against the post-war resurgence of the former enemies (Germany and Japan).²² In the 1990s we have shown a tendency to follow an analogous approach to Russia, at least for the time being. This is a mistake. Russia's military, along with their defense industry, have been in an inexorable, destructive, demoralizing decline since the end of 1991. Leading Russian politicians count survival as Russia's most pressing national interest, and this will clearly be served by keeping an open U.S. option. Yet the way of thinking of many in the U.S. foreign policy elite is still tinged with nostalgia for the good old Soviet threat.

In the early 21st century, a stabilized and economically robust Russia could be an extremely important ally in the new regional order: first (but not only) to the south of Russia, where the oil reserves of the Caspian Basin may rival those of the Persian Gulf, and where the turbulent and militarized borders of Islam encroach. Russia's own proven energy reserves are even bigger than those of the Caspian. Place names in the region, like Novorossiisk, Krasnoyarsk, Tengiz, Baku, and Kovitkinskoye, will rapidly become familiar to Americans concerned with our national security in the early 21st century.

For these purposes, I support a NATO/Russia Charter that would give Russia a real voice in the security issues that NATO will be acting on over the next quarter century. These arrangements will be essential, in my judgement, to the legitimacy of a European security system in the early 21st century. They would lay the foundation for ensuring Russian help for three of our own (and many others') national interests: a strong and truly global energy system, in which Russia itself, and the Caspian Sea region, would be copious sources of oil and gas; containment of Islamic militarism; and no hostile hegemon in Europe.

The Challenge for American National Security.

America's national security in the early 21st century can be protected only if our Presidents and congresses are able to define, decide, and persuade the American public—and the leading powers of the world's other civilizations—of our vital national interests, and our determination to advance and defend them. This will not be an overnight effort, and it will take more than words—important as words are. What it will take is American mastery (preferably with allies) of the twin transformations: the geopolitical and the military-technological, and their powerful interaction.

Requirement for U.S. Military to Dominate. Part of the American persuasiveness will be the maintenance of a superior, coercive American military force—and its continuous renewal well into the 21st century—to dominate

the emerging worldwide revolution in military affairs. This does not mean keeping the same or a larger number of divisions, air wings, and fleets as today. It does not mean adding more new versions of the same weapons.

It does not necessarily mean adding dollars to the Defense budget. U.S. military planners and industry must now move past the *status quo* or possibly fall behind lesser rivals who face fewer obstacles. In the early 21st century, the U.S. military could become the victims of the revolution in military affairs, rather than its pacesetters, no matter what our budget is. These tendencies could lead by 2015 or so to great difficulty for our forces in the face of rogue states or major powers who could deny access to, or even evict us from, areas of vital national interest like the Persian Gulf or East Asia or the high seas—or threaten the existence of our allies.

The Challenges and the Obstacles.

With the rise to prominence, in the hands of several powers, of weaponized unmanned aerial vehicles, affordable high-resolution spy satellites, massive numbers of stealthy cruise and ballistic missiles, distributed high-performance anti-air missile systems and (in the hands of states and sub-state actors) information warfare technologies and organizations, the coming military revolution could transform war in the early 21st century. Already, according to one survey, 35 non-NATO countries have ballistic missiles—of which 18 are capable of carrying nuclear, biological, or chemical warheads. Sixty-seven non-NATO countries possess cruise missiles.²³ China's General Ding Henggao told me in Beijing last year that precision guided missiles are the most important single system in China's future defense posture. My own research leads me to estimate that China holds between 300 and 950 nuclear warheads in inventory.

Among the obstacles confronting American military planners today are a system in which Congress continues to spend too much money on old weapons and industry lobbies

Congress to do so, and a lack of realism about the scale and speed of change in the way geopolitics actually works. Internal obstacles include our own military's tendency to disregard the ability of our rivals to respond to, or leapfrog, our own plans. We say we won our last war, so we don't need to change much. This overlooks the fact that our last enemy lost his war in full view of the rest of the world—and today many others in the world are undertaking heroic efforts to overcome American concepts and weapons.

Our main rivals' military revolutions are paced by their cash flow (and even accelerated by commercial imports of technology from the United States and Western Europe). We are paced by our development lead times and the Federal Acquisition Regulations. The contrast between government procurement and America's private sector has been particularly dramatic: inventiveness and flexibility have been our civilian hallmarks, capitalizing on new technology in every field. I believe new ways to spin-in from the commercial economy with its lower costs and excellence of performance could help our military to get ahead and stay ahead. The U.S. Air Force is already moving strongly toward commercial services, products and technologies to modernize most unclassified space systems.

The U.S. Defense Budget Structure and Size. These days the Congress is considering President Clinton's proposed defense budget for fiscal year 1998, and beginning to discuss the administration's statutory Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General John Shalikashvili's "Joint Vision 2010"—an important reference for the QDR and for the proposed budget—said last year that the "U.S. must prepare to face a wider range of threats, emerging unpredictability, employing varying combinations of technology, and challenging us at varying levels of intensity." As the defense budget continues to drift downward, however, funding to deal with "emerging unpredictability" is falling like a rock.

The Clinton administration and the Congress are set to let overall defense funding decline slightly over the next 5 years. Given the powerful national political momentum to

reduce the federal deficit while protecting entitlements and cutting taxes,²⁴ this is about the best that can be expected. The Republicans' 1996 Congressional Budget Resolution actually projected deeper (5 percent) cuts in the Defense budget by 2002 than does the Clinton administration.

The problem is the structure of the Defense budget: the administration and Congress plan to increase major weapon system purchases by almost 40 percent by 2002 while funding for Research and Development (R&D) is projected to decline by over 15 percent during the same period. The military's Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations were slashed by Congress by 40 percent last year. Funding has dropped by about 20 percent over the past 3 years for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), where many of the most innovative programs with the potential for yielding revolutionary improvements in information technology and access to theaters of vital interest are located. The administration now proposes a slight increase (about 2 percent) for DARPA over the next 2 years.

Secretary of Defense Cohen's task is a formidable one. It is to lead an American revolution in military affairs and to restructure the Defense budget to insure American dominance of information systems, awareness technologies, and directed energy weapons by 2010. Otherwise, our opponents may be able to keep us out of regions of vital national interest, checkmating anything else we might do with the rest of our military establishment.

Conclusion: The Need for American Leadership.

Any understanding of American national security in the early 21st century must begin with the way the White House, and the Republican Congress that swept into power in 1994, have ignored the far-reaching double transformation: first, in the international order, especially in the Islamic heartland and in East Asia—and second, the worldwide revolution in military affairs. They have also

ignored the unique leadership capacity of the United States among the major power centers of the world.

There is a perception both at home and abroad that the United States, which remains the greatest power of them all, has been turning inward—walking away from the top of the stack. At home there is uneasiness about risks to vital national interests, and a sense of losing out on the rewards of global leadership. Overseas, China and other major powers are concluding—I hope they are wrong—that reliable American leadership may be a thing of the past. These perceptions can lead to future coalitions against the United States. If we are not going to lead, others may try to do so themselves. For example, the Premier of China and the President of Russia in Beijing last year proposed a China-Russia “strategic partnership for the 21st century.”²⁵ Theoretically such a “partnership” (which remains largely inchoate) could come to include Iran, with which both China and Russia have strong financial and weapons links, and possibly Iraq.

It is true that the domestic political base for a national security policy that would take good care of vital and important interests in the early 21st century is uncertain. The foundations for domestic political confidence are weak. There is widespread skepticism toward a government and a political system that sometimes seem tawdry, slow, indifferent, and incapable of getting things right. In this domestic climate, there are those who say it is not possible to have a coherent national security policy.

Still, the United States does have vital and important national interests in the world, and the Presidents and congresses over the next quarter century are still the only citizens who can define, lead, and persuade the country of those national interests which affect everyone, for good or ill. Moreover we—and we alone—will continue to have the intellectual and military power, and the skill, and the global prestige to lead.

For the next 4 years the President and the Vice President, despite their fevered distractions, must try to

prepare the country for the early 21st century by giving sustained attention to our vital and important national interests, rather than our sentimental or moralistic impulses. We must focus on Russia, China, Japan, and Western Europe—not to pressure them to follow domestic and foreign policies that we would dictate, but to increase their interest in cooperating with their neighbors, and with the United States. In this we must enlist the active cooperation of the Europeans—who rub shoulders with Russia, are closer than we are to turbulent Islam, and do more trade with East Asia than they do across the Atlantic.

The opportunities are wide open for U.S. leadership here at home; and they are wide open substantively all around the world. I hope President Clinton and Vice President Gore will exploit these opportunities to their political advantage. I hope the Republicans in Congress will compete with them on this basis, to their political advantage. It would be good for the country, and good for the world.

All this will require more than analyses like the one I have offered here today. The great flowing river of our unique national history has sometimes rushed through shallow and turbulent white water rapids, sometimes eddied in foul and dreadful stagnant pools, once fought “a great civil war, testing whether [this] nation or any nation so conceived and so dedicated, can long endure.”²⁶ Sometimes this nation has, by its very example, overflowed its banks in floodwaters of great benefit to the whole world. Through all our history has coursed a deep and powerful current fed by everlasting springs of purpose, endurance, and courage—often in the face of great adversity and animosity.

Many articulate and passionate Americans today, however, believe the United States is morally unfit to lead. Many others believe the opposite: the outside world is so corrupt that it is not worthy of American efforts. For these reasons purposeful and confident American leadership will not be sustainable in the early 21st century unless it is actively and consistently supported by young men and women like you in this room, who understand America, and

understand the world. For you and for the United States, the early 21st century holds great dangers and exciting opportunities. The helm is in your hands, the compass is in your heads, and the driving power is in your love of this great nation.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 5

1. I am indebted to François Heisbourg, the brilliant European strategic analyst, for drawing my attention to what he calls the simultaneous transformations. His fuller explanation will appear in a forthcoming publication.

2. Reported by Anthony Lewis in *The New York Times Magazine*, March 23, 1997, p. 43.

3. These projections are suggested by a number of engineers. See, for example, T.K. Jones in *Electronics Industries Association Ten-Year Forecast*, Washington: 32nd Annual Ten-Year Forecast Conference, October 17-18, 1996, pp. 155-159.

4. An expanded analysis of the contemporary revolution in military affairs is set out in Michael G. Vickers, *Warfare in 2020: A Primer*, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Washington: 1996.

5. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996. Huntington's thesis is also controversial because it cuts across the grain of the American ideology of Progress. Rather than drawing on ideology, Huntington uses rigorous observation and strict empiricism.

6. Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994, p. 812.

7. For a fuller discussion of "national interests," see "A Report from the Commission on America's National Interests": Robert Ellsworth, Andrew Goodpaster, Rita Hauser, Co-Chairs, 1996. Co-Executive Directors were Graham Allison, Dimitri Simes, and James Thomson. This report includes definitions of the 6 vital national interests I have listed above, plus 12 "extremely important" national interests such as preventing and ending major conflicts in important geographic regions, and preventing massive uncontrolled immigration across U.S. borders; 11 "just important" ones such as discouraging massive human rights violations in foreign countries as a matter of official government policy; and 5 "less important" or secondary ones such as balancing bilateral trade deficits and enlarging democracy elsewhere for its own sake.

8. "Demolition Man," *The New York Review of Books*, March 27, 1997, p. 16.

9. My understanding of China's economy is drawn from Charles Wolf, Jr., of RAND's presentation "Security Implications of Long-Term Economic and Military Trends in Asia," to the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, in Beijing, June 17-18, 1996. Wolf is careful and professional, and he acknowledges that all analyses of the Chinese economy including his own are uncertain and controversial.

10. Dr. Michael Pillsbury has gathered and translated a large body of hard-to-get Chinese military leaders' writings, and has now made them available in *Chinese Views of Future Warfare*, ed. Michael Pillsbury, Washington: National Defense University, Institute of National Strategic Studies, 1997.

11. *Ibid.*, in the Preface.

12. *Energy Demands in Five Major Asian Developing Countries*, Ishiguro and Akiyama: Washington: The World Bank, 1995, pp. 146-147.

13. From an analysis prepared by the Office of Naval Intelligence and published in May 1996.

14. Taiwan, "Mainland Affairs Council News Briefing," March 10, 1997, No. 0016.

15. Ernest Gellner, *Plough, Sword and Book: The Structure of Human History*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1988, p. 113.

16. Huntington, p. 117.

17. Samuel P. Huntington, "Hassner's Bad Bad Review," *The National Interest*, No. 47, Spring 1997, p. 99.

18. "The Economist," January 4, 1997, p. 33.

19. *Aerospace Daily*, March 19, 1997, pp. 409-410.

20. Based upon an analysis by Dr. Jeremy Azreal, RAND, and sent to me in a private communication.

21. The nuclear materials stockpiles in Russia are of particular concern because weapons material accounting is in a very poor state. See Albright, Berkhout, and Walker, *Plutonium and Highly Enriched*

Uranium 1996: World Inventories, Capabilities and Policies, SIPRI, New York: Oxford University Press, 1997.

22. Perry M. Smith, *The Air Force Plans for Peace, 1943-1945*, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970, pp. 51-53.

23. "The Economist," January 4, 1997, p. 33.

24. President Clinton and Congressional leaders are promising to balance the budget and cut taxes, but some 77 percent of Americans oppose any reduction in future spending on Social Security and Medicare, according to a nationwide poll conducted March 13-23 by *The Washington Post*, Harvard University and the Kaiser Family Foundation, *The Washington Post*, March 29, 1997, p. A4.

25. XINHUA in English, April 25, 1996.

26. Lincoln demonstrated courage, hope, and great faith in delivering the Gettysburg Address on November 19, 1863—almost a year before the decisive actions at Mobile Bay and Atlanta, and Lincoln's own reelection.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

AMBASSADOR ROBERT ELLSWORTH is the President, Robert Ellsworth Company, Inc. A former congressman from the state of Kansas, Ambassador Ellsworth has served as U.S. Ambassador to NATO (1969-71), Assistant Secretary of Defense (1974-75) and Deputy Secretary of Defense (1975-77). He has also served as Director of the Atlantic Council of the United States and the American Council on Germany. Between 1990 and 1996, he was Chairman of the Council of The International Institute for Strategic Studies. Ambassador Ellsworth was a key advisor on foreign affairs to Senator Robert Dole during the 1996 Presidential campaign.

DR. MORTON H. HALPERIN is a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. Dr. Halperin has held senior positions in both the Department of Defense (1966 to 1969) and the National Security Council (1969) and served as Director of the Washington Office of the American Civil Liberties Union (1984 to 1992). Between 1994 and 1996 Dr. Halperin served as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Democracy at the National Security Council. Much of Dr. Halperin's writing has focused on the tension between the demands of national security and civil liberties.

DR. DAVID JABLONSKY is the Professor of National Security Affairs, Department of National Security and Strategy, U.S. Army War College. A graduate of Dartmouth College, Kansas University and Boston University, Dr. Jablonsky is the author of four books dealing with European history and international relations. He is a retired infantry colonel who has held the Elihu Root Chair of Strategy and the George C. Marshall Chair of Military Studies at the U.S. Army War College.

DR. LAWRENCE KORB is Director of the Center for Public Policy Education, The Brookings Institution. Dr. Korb is the author of 15 books and over 100 articles on national

security issues. He served as Assistant Secretary of Defense from 1981 through 1985 and was awarded the DoD Distinguished Public Service Medal for his contributions in this position. Thereafter, Dr. Korb focused his research on issues relating to the defense budget, interservice cooperation and defense procurement. Since the end of the Cold War, Dr. Korb has been a key figure in the debate about the future of the civilian defense industrial base.

PROFESSOR RONALD STEEL teaches at both George Washington University and the University of Southern California. A graduate of both Harvard University and the Sorbonne, Professor Steel is the author of five major books and numerous essays and articles on issues relating to American politics and foreign affairs. He is a Pulitzer Prize finalist whose writings have won such prestigious awards as the National Book Critics' Circle Award, the Bancroft Prize in American History and the American Book Award. His 1995 book, entitled *Temptations of a Superpower*, is a provocative analysis of the prospects for U.S. foreign policy in a post-Cold War context. Professor Steel has been a contributing editor for *The New Republic* since 1980.

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**Authors
Ambassador Robert Ellsworth
Dr. Morton H. Halperin
Dr. David Jablonsky
Dr. Lawrence Korb
Professor Ronald Steel**

**Director of Publications and Production
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